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The di¢ culties and obstacles faced by the poorer nations of the global economy on the
path to development are extremely diverse. A thesis that aims to address some of the more
interesting facets of development is itself likely to be wide ranging and so it proves with this
dissertation. This thesis is a collection of four chapters which consider an array of pertinent
questions regarding developing nations. Although there is not a singular issue or topic that
connects the components of this thesis, each chapter addresses, in this author￿ s opinion,
at least one of the more interesting issues of economic development. This thesis is neither
wholly empirical or theoretical, macro or micro and instead maybe viewed as an eclectic mix
of approaches and ideas that go some way to representing the challenges faced by the world￿ s
least developed economies. In the following paragraphs, a brief overview of each of the four
chapters is given.
The ￿rst chapter of this thesis, A Further Unbundling of Institutions: An Application to
Volatility and the Implications for Institutional Reform, explores the varying e⁄ects of as-
pects of institutional quality on di⁄erent categories of economic volatility. In particular, the
institutional bundle is decomposed in a similar, yet more extensive, manner to Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2003) and the resulting indicators of institutional quality are used to
explain cross-country di⁄erences in the volatility of GDP growth, consumption, investment
and trade. Uniquely, this paper introduces an exogenous instrument for political aspects
of the institutional bundle, making use the POLCON index of political fractionalisation to
include a relative political constraints variable to the model. The results show that each type
of volatility is a⁄ected by di⁄ering combinations of the institutional quality instruments and
thus, implies that policy which is concerned with dampening a speci￿c type of economic
volatility should speci￿cally target a given proportion of the institutional bundle. Further-
more, it should become apparent that it should not longer be acceptable in future works to
use broad, subjective variables to represent institutional quality.
The second chapter, Diversi￿cation in Primary Commodity Production: A Path to Self-
Insurance and Development, investigates the theory behind the largely failed policy of import
substitution industrialisation and in particular, that the issue of long term decline in real
commodity prices relative to manufactures is secondary to that of primary commodity price
volatility for countries at the lower end of the development scale. We forward a policy of
diversi￿cation across production in the primary commodity sector within developing coun-
tries; speci￿cally that this type of diversi￿cation can insulate developing economies from the
e⁄ects of highly volatile primary commodity prices in a manner akin to modern portfolio
theory and thus, promote growth and development. Furthermore, empirical results suggest




that diversi￿cation may act as a substitute to ￿nancial development as a means to dampen
terms of trade volatility in countries with poorly established economies.
The third chapter, Sticks and Stones: A Theory of Point Resources and Appropria-
tion, extends the general equilibrium model of appropriation and production as presented
in Grossman and Kim (1996), by including a parameter to represent the pointiness of the
contested resource endowment. The e⁄ects of pointiness on appropriation and defence cre-
ate non-linearities, resulting in a number of (non-monotonic) relationships between resource
pointiness and con￿ ict. It is demonstrated that appropriative equilibria may not necessarily
be more socially costly in a non-aggressive equilibrium or that a non-aggressive equilibrium
may not necessarily preserved the ￿ social ordering￿ , despite an absence of appropriative ac-
tivity. Further, the rich will only favour more secure claims to property if there would be no
relatively ￿ cheap￿targets created as a result of weaker security of claims. Likewise, the poor
may not automatically favour weaker claims to property.
The fourth and ￿nal chapter, The Kids Aren￿ t Alright: Child Mortality and the Persis-
tence of Child Labour, extends the discrete time, overlapping generations model of Chakraborty
and Das (2005). The model presented here includes a child survival function, where the rate
of survival of a child is dependent on the healthcare expenditure of the young parent. It is
demonstrated that the inclusion of this function reinforces the endogenous time preference
mechanism outlined in Chakraborty and Das (2005) by increasing the cost of education and
thus, future consumption. Inclusion of the child survival function thus reinforces the preva-
lence and persistence of child labour. Further, the paper elucidates on policy implications
and makes algebraic corrections to the original paper.
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A FURTHER UNBUNDLING OF INSTITUTIONS
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to contribute to two areas of economic research which may
currently be described as in vogue; the understanding of economic volatility as a barrier to
long term growth and the breakdown of institutional bundle into component parts and e⁄ects.
Recently, groups of collaborative authors (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) have shown the importance of rejecting subjective
or indeed endogenous measures of institutional quality. This paper uses this body of work
as a basis for an application to economic volatility. In particular, the work of Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2003) is extended so that the institutional bundle is decomposed
into four separate entities. Uniquely, one of these entities is a variable that represents
contemporaneous institutional change in the political spectrum, a measure which is derived
from the POLCON index of political fractionalization prevalent in the work of Henisz (2002,
2004).
It is only in the last decade or so that economic research has strongly suggested that
economic volatility is detrimental to long term economic performance, especially in terms
of GDP growth rates (see Ramey and Ramey (1995) for instance). As such, it would seem
logical to try to understand the indirect role institutions play in promoting growth, insofar
as ￿ high quality￿institutions will serve the purpose of reducing economic volatility. On the
role of institutions, North (1983) states:
Institutions provide the incentive structure of the economy and it is that structure,
through its development, that determines the direction of the economy.
It is through this role that institutions not only determine the direction of the economy
but also how steady the chosen economic path will be. Both historical (17th Century English
Revolutions) and contemporary (Central Bank independence trends) instances of institutions
ful￿lling this role are highlighted within this paper. These examples serve to demonstrate,
allegorically, that it is not only the direct e⁄ect of institutions on growth or GDP levels that
is signi￿cant, but also the indirect e⁄ect, through the institutional e⁄ect on volatility, that
can play an important role in determining economic outcomes.
The main objective of this paper is to be able to empirically investigate the relationship
1
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between institutions and economic volatility in this context. By decomposing the institu-
tional bundle into economic, political, legal and cultural entities that are both objective and
exogenous, it is therefore possible to use these variables in an econometric framework to
explain varying types of economic volatility (speci￿cally GDP growth volatility, consump-
tion growth volatility, terms of trade volatility and foreign direct investment volatility are
chosen). The consequences of doing this should be twofold: ￿rstly, it should be observed
that institutional variables will, of course, di⁄er in their explanatory power for a given type
of volatility and secondly, that institutional variable will di⁄er in their explanatory power
across types of volatility. In essence, it will be shown that di⁄ering (combinations of) aspects
of the decomposed institutional bundle will be signi￿cant for explaining economic volatil-
ity and the identity of these signi￿cant aspects will depend on the type of volatility under
scrutiny.
Perhaps on the outset, given these stated aims, it may be reasonable to hypothesise
that volatility in variables such as GDP growth and consumption growth may be linked
to political and economic factors, as can be seen in the following example of 17th Century
institutional reform. Furthermore, volatility of variables that could be argued to re￿ ect the
relationship between a given country and a ￿ basket￿of its trading partners, such as terms
of trade or foreign direct investment levels, might be more signi￿cantly linked to variables
representing the quality of the legal system or cultural constitution. Such variables may
implicitly represent international accountability or trustworthiness. These issues shall be
explored and possible explanations for any di⁄erences in institutional in￿ uence on volatility
shall be discussed.
Summarising, this paper will be drawn towards two conclusions. Firstly, that it is no
longer acceptable in economic literature, or indeed any kind of quantitative analysis, to
use subjective, endogenous or generalised variables to represent institutions or institutional
quality and secondly, that any form of institutional reform needs to be speci￿cally tailored
to a particular aspect of the institutional bundle, dependent upon the precise aspect of the
economy the policy is ultimately designed to a⁄ect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses background litera-
ture concerning volatility, section 3 discusses background literature concerning institutions,
section 4 deals with empirical implications, section 5 presents results and section 6 concludes.
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1.2 Literature
1.2.1 An Overview of Volatility
The literature concerning the relationship between institutional quality and macro-
economic volatility is scarce and thus, a key motivation for this paper. In the following
section, the importance of volatility as a variable of interest is outlined, as is the theoretical
relationship between institutions and volatility.
It may be expected that the common belief concerning this relationship would be that
higher institutional quality was bene￿cial in the sense that economic volatility would be
dampened, thus promoting higher levels of growth. This type of relationship can be illus-
trated with both historical and contemporary examples.
In pre-16th century England, the Monarchy held signi￿cant powers of expropriation and
could raise taxes or redistribute assets in almost any manner they saw ￿t. Due to the un-
certainty and volatility of taxation and ownership, institutions during these times failed to
provide the necessary incentives for economic agents to invest in land, technology or capital,
either physical or human, and failed to foster economic growth. However, the expansion
of trans-Atlantic trade and changes in the English land markets during the 16th and 17th
greatly empowered certain groups in society, namely merchants and landowners. These
groups were twice able to overthrow the Stuart Monarchy during the 17th century (Eng-
lish Civil War, 1642-1649, and the Glorious Revolution, 1688) and subsequent institutional
reforms granted economic rights and political power to a much wider group of agents than
had previously been experienced. Arguably, it was these institutional changes that laid the
foundations of the Industrial Revolution to follow.
A more contemporary example of institutional quality a⁄ecting economic volatility is
the trend for central bank independence. This is seen as important factor in taking eco-
nomic decisions away from those who gain political or personally. If politicians are able to
manipulate economic policy, they may be able to engineer favourable economic outcomes at
political sensitive times, especially during pre-election periods. This results in higher in￿ a-
tionary volatility and political business cycles (Alesina, 1989). Another means of limiting
the actions of politicians, linked with the idea of central bank independence, is to create a
system with a greater separation of powers and therefore, more checks and balances of the
policymakers.
Although there is some uncertainty as to the exact relationship between volatility and
growth, recent papers, both empirical and theoretical, have suggested that there is indeed a
negative correlation between the two.
Mott, Graham (2010), Essays in Economic Development 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/229621.2. LITERATURE 4
Ramey and Ramey (1995) shows that countries with larger ￿ uctuations in GDP growth
will tend to have lower average GDP growth, a relationship that is robust in the inclusion of
standard control variables. In addition, government spending induced volatility is negatively
associated with growth even when time and country ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled for. The lit-
erature suggests a number of reasons why volatility is detrimental to economic performance.
From a household perspective, risk-averse households save less when returns to capital are
volatile (Rosenwzeig and Wolpin, 1993) and similarly, Pindyck (1991) argues that if invest-
ment contains irreversibilities, i.e. sunk costs, then increased volatility will necessarily lower
investment. Furthermore, errors due to uncertainty-induced planning are costly for ￿rms
(Ramey and Ramey, 1991), as is the need to move factors of production between sectors in
the need to rectify such errors (Bertola 1994, Dixit and Rob, 1994).
Koren and Tenreyro (2006) have sought to decompose the volatility of GDP growth into
component parts in work comparable to an accounting exercise. Using this breakdown of
volatility, the question of why poor countries experience much greater volatility of GDP
growth in comparison to rich ones is addressed. Three explanations are o⁄ered and devel-
oped for the cause of this di⁄erence; poor countries in comparison specialize in fewer, more
inherently volatile sectors, poor countries experience more frequent and severe macroeco-
nomic shocks and that a higher correlation exists in poor countries between macroeconomic
￿ uctuations and the shocks which speci￿cally a⁄ect the sectors those countries specialize
in. Whilst this related work is readily acknowledged, the approach in this paper is more
concerned with volatility of some key macroeconomic variables and with the primary focus
of investigating the hypothesised role of institutions as dampeners of said volatility. The
relationships between institutional factors and the decomposition of volatility, or indeed of
its microfoundations, are left as an area for future research.
It has not only been the link between the volatility of GDP growth and growth itself
which has been the focus of research. Literature in Development Economics, particularly,
has been keen to explore the relationship between terms of trade volatility and GDP growth.
Blattman et al (2007) ￿nds that countries that experience more volatile terms of trade also
have relatively lower levels of growth (although in the models presented, terms of trade
volatilities vary between countries due to national commodity specialization where com-
modities have heterogeneous price volatilities1). Mendoza (1997) ￿nds the same result using
a sample of forty countries, both industrialised and developing, for the period 1970-1991 and
Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003) ￿nd strong evidence of the same negative correlation
1However, further research may highlight that commodity price volatilities may be greatly a⁄ected by
institutional quality, especially in the cases of countries with more mobile resource bases.
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in a sample of 61 developing countries, between 1975 and 1992. Therefore, it seems that in
any paper aiming to explore the issue of the e⁄ect of institutional quality on volatility, and
thus indirectly GDP growth, terms of trade volatility should feature prominently.
The measures of economic volatility utilised in this paper will be the following: the
volatility of GDP growth, the volatility of consumption growth, terms of trade volatility and
the volatility of the logarithm of net foreign direct investment. The intuition behind the
use of these measures as dependent variables in this paper is that they are key, headline
indicators of economic development and performance. Also, statistics on these variables are
available for a large number of countries, over a wide time period and they are measured
in the same manner. This is not the case for other measures of volatility, especially with
regards to measurement units and scales.
The fundamental hypothesis of this paper is that the explanatory signi￿cance of di⁄erent
institutions aspects will vary according to the type of volatility measured. For example, legal
institutions may be expected to play a more important role in explaining investment volatility
than cultural institutions per se. In order to test this, the volatility of four macroeconomic
variables has been chosen, as stated above. The data for these variables comes from the
World Development Indicators2 and the Penn World Tables.
Below, the role and choice of institutional instruments is discussed.
1.2.2 An Overview of Institutions
It is only recently that economists have begun to look seriously at the empirics
behind institutional quality and economic performance. In this section, some of this work is
highlighted and the case for institutions as a topic of research is furthered.
Given the events in the Far East of 1997 it is of no surprise that much of this work has
focused the role of institutions with regard to ￿nancial liberalisations. Chinn and Ito (2002)
proposes that ￿nancial systems with higher degrees of development in legal institutions, on
average, bene￿t more from ￿nancial liberalisation than those with lower levels3. At the
time of the East Asian crisis, commentators questioned the institutional framework of the
a⁄ected countries. Bhagwati (1997) criticizes the U.S. Treasury and IMF for rushing too
many countries into liberalising their capital markets without due consideration to whether
domestic market regulation was su¢ cient to cope with the rapid changes. Furthermore,
2Henceforth WDI.
3There is a need to reach a threshold level of institutional development before it is seen that a higher
level of ￿nancial openness leads to equity market development. Indeed, if the threshold is not reached then
increased openness can be harmful to equity market development.
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Chinn and Ito (2002) also highlight the need to specify the particular signi￿cance of di⁄erent
institutional aspects. The results show that it is general legal systems and non-￿nancial
speci￿c institutions that are crucial for bene￿ting from increased openness.
A point that should be readily addressed is that institutional quality variables that are
used in much of the empirical literature have a tendency to be endogenous. For example, it
is easy to observe that countries which have high levels of GDP are more likely to have better
quality institutions and it is easy to map this relationship. However, di¢ culty arises when
determining causality as not only will better quality institutions contribute to the achieve-
ment of higher levels of GDP but richer countries will simultaneously be able to a⁄ord either
better quality institutions or the reform of pre-existing, poor quality institutions. Therefore,
any correlation between contemporary institutional quality variables and economic outcomes
is likely to be capturing a signi￿cant degree of reverse causality.
Whilst many papers have largely failed to recognise the importance of endogeneity in
specifying regressions of GDP and institutional quality, a body of work by Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (AJR) has gone some way to addressing this particular issue. Their work uses
mortality rates of European settlers during the 1600￿ s as an instrument for contemporaneous
institutional quality. It is proposed that there existed two di⁄erent types of colony, extractive
states (e.g. Belgian Congo) and neo-Europes (Australia, Canada etc). Coloniser strategy
depended on settlement feasibility; where the disease environment was unfavourable then the
probability of Neo-Europe creation was low and extractive states more likely prevailed. The
observation that the early framework of colonial institutions in essence re￿ ected the wants
of settlers is supported by earlier research, such as Denoon (1983).
It is argued that these Colonial states and institutions continue to persist, even after
independence. Amongst the reasons cited for this persistence are that colonisers have pre-
viously incurred a large sunk cost to found institutions and little incentive for costly reform
may exist, especially if gains from extractive institutions are shared amongst a small elite.
Moreover, in￿ uential agents may have made sunk investments which are complimentary to
certain institutional types. However, even though there are long periods of institutional
persistence, it must be recognised that in the last three decades, the institutional landscape
has changed signi￿cantly, especially in the political spectrum. Empirical work must have the
capabilities of capturing these more recent changes.
Settler mortality serves as a good instrument in the respect that it should have no e⁄ect
on current output other than its e⁄ect on institutions. The majority of European settler
deaths were caused by either yellow fever or malaria and had little e⁄ect on the indigenous
adults. Therefore, diseases are unlikely to be a signi￿cant reason as to why many African
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and Asian countries are poor today.
The work of AJR, the use of institutional instruments and empirical pitfalls are further
expanded upon in the following section.
1.3 Empirics
1.3.1 Empirical Hazards
When dealing with the institutional quality and volatility, it could be argued that
any correlation between the two is generated mainly by causality from the former and reverse
causality does not have the same signi￿cance, or pose the same problems, as in the example
above. Good institutions theoretically have directly positive e⁄ects on both volatility and
GDP levels, as highlighted above, but also have an indirect e⁄ect on GDP levels with volatil-
ity acting as a medium. Although it can be said that richer countries can a⁄ord to create
better institutions or reform those which are poor, there seems to be no plausible theoretical
argument in the literature as to why volatility directly a⁄ects institutional quality.
It is not only the direction of causality that is of concern with variables of institutional
quality. Often datasets, such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or Polity IV,
contain contemporary measures of institutional quality that are purely subjective, such as
level of democracy, bureaucratic quality, corruption, autocracy etc. In the main, this type
of variable will create two problems. Firstly, it is reasonable to expect that variables of a
subjective manner are exposed to a signi￿cant degree of measurement error and may not
properly re￿ ect the true state of outcomes they represented. Thus any regression analysis
will be adversely a⁄ected by the relationship between the omitted characteristics on pol-
icy/institutions and economic outcomes. Secondly, any historical outcome of a subjective
variable is most likely to be solely an ex-post, ￿tted observation and indeed, a lack of histor-
ically consistent information leads to endogeneity if current information or opinion is used to
estimate historical outcomes. Measures that are a⁄ected in this manner can result in models
having poor predictive power. Citing the East Asian crisis as an example, Henisz (2004)
states:
Importantly, the correlation between these subjective measures and the true nature of the
political institutions may breakdown precisely when correct measures would be most valuable.
Furthermore, previous empirical work on institutions commonly bundles many cultural,
legal, political and ￿nancial facets together under a broad brush indicator or conversely,
chooses to focus solely on the e⁄ect of one of facet. While it may greatly simplify the empirics
of such work to focus on broad indicators, and indeed may enable equally broad statements
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to be validated, there is a need to deconstruct these indicators to ￿nd out which types of
institutions matter and how they can a⁄ect the volatility of di⁄erent aspects of the economy.
However, it is also equally important that empirical investigations focus on the institutional
framework, so that any deconstruction does not overlook important institutional factors.
Thus, in this paper, we aim to justify the use of a number of variables which simultaneously
represent the e⁄ects of institutional quality on volatility, whilst also ful￿lling requirements
concerning independence and exogeneity. Below, the steps to achieve the separation of
institutional e⁄ects are outlined.
As stated previously, institutions are the body of arrangements which constrain agents
economically, politically, culturally and legally. If this is taken as the de￿nition of institu-
tions then each of these aspects much be addressed when looking at a decomposition of the
institutional cluster. Key to the argument of this decomposition is the possibility that each
of the four aspects may be represented by variables that can be deemed as exogenous and
independence. The literature of political economy has touched upon this subject, for exam-
ple Knack and Keefer (1995) argue that measures such as degree of democracy or political
or civil liberties need not be correlated with the level of property rights. Indeed, it is easy
to think of anecdotal examples where there is obviously a contrast in political and economic
institutional qualities. At present, China has laws restricting freedom of speech, expression,
religion and political choice yet has signi￿cantly better quality economic institutions and
business is relatively free to proceed. On the other hand, Russia seems to uphold the in-
stitutions that China lacks but Russian economic institutions are of much poorer quality,
frequent expropriation takes place at all levels and business progression is hindered by eco-
nomic corruption. In between, the US may be heralded as an example of a nation of high
quality institutions. It seems reasonable to accept, based on empirical, theoretical and anec-
dotal sources, that it is indeed possible to separate the institutional threads in this manner,
given a set of correctly chosen instruments. This matter is discussed below.
1.3.2 Institutional Instruments
A challenge that is faced by all empirical work dealing with institutions is ￿rstly to
￿nd variables or instruments which re￿ ect institutional quality. In the most part, regressions
dealing a contemporary measure of institutional quality su⁄er from some form of endogeneity.
If variables for GDP, consumption, trade or investment were regressed on a measure such
as stock market valuation, as an instrument for ￿nancial development, then the results of
these regressions would certainly su⁄er from endogeneity. For example, higher investment
would cause higher stock valuations and these higher valuations may act as signal of a
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healthy economy and encourage further investment. Therefore, the most key element of the
￿declustering￿exercise is to ￿nd exogenous, independent instruments.
Some previous work has concentrated on the ￿declustering￿of institutional variables and
highlighted the varying in￿ uence of institutional aspects, as discussed above, on economic
outcomes. La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny4 (1997,1998) highlight the impor-
tance of colonizer identity and legal origins of current institution, in particular that former
British colonies and common law countries fare better in terms of ￿nancial development. Ro-
drik (2000) suggests that democracies experience less volatility than non-democratic regimes.
Also, Von Hayek (1960) argues that British common law tradition was superior to French
civil law for general economic development.
In a recent paper, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003), e⁄orts have been made to ￿unbundle￿
the institutional cluster. The aim of this exercise is to investigate the relative importance of
contracting institutions, i.e. those which involve upholding private contracts, and property
rights institutions, i.e. those which protect against government expropriation. The former
can be measured by legal formalism, in particular by variables measuring the number of legal
procedures needed to resolve a simple common case (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes,
and Shleifer5, 2003). The latter can be measured by variables for expropriation risk or
constraints on the executive. Due to issues of endogeneity as outlined above, instruments
are used to represent these institutions, namely settler mortality and population density
in 1500 as an instrument for expropriation risk (see AJR 2002, 2003) and legal origin or
coloniser identity as an instrument for legal formalisation (see DLLS, 2003 and LLSV, 1997,
1998). Of the countries sampled, those with greater political constraints and protection
from expropriation have signi￿cantly higher incomes per capita; higher investment rates; a
higher ratio of private sector credit to GDP and more developed stock markets. Conversely,
those countries with greater legal formalism tend to have less developed stock markets, yet
neither income per capita, the private credit to GDP ratio nor the rate of investment are
impacted. These results maintain the theory that the di⁄erent aspects of the institutional
cluster should be considered when investigate the economic e⁄ects of institutions and that
these di⁄erent aspects have varying e⁄ects.
However, whilst an instrument has been used to solely represent the legal aspect of the
institutional cluster, using either settler mortality or population density acts to instrument
both for economic and political institutions simultaneously. Furthermore, by using solely
historical instruments there is no scope for these results to re￿ ect any of the institutional
4Henceforth, LLSV
5Henceforth, DLLS.
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changes that have been witnessed in the past few decades. This paper will endeavour to
construct a variable that is exogenous and that also represents both the distinct political
aspect of the institutional cluster and contemporary institutional changes.
In further support of including di⁄erent institutional aspects, Stulz and Williamson
(2003) use both religion and legal origin in regression analysis in order for two di⁄erent
aspects of the institutional landscape, cultural and legal, to be controlled for in an indepen-
dent and exogenous manner. They ￿nd that legal origin is more important than religion
in explaining equity holder protection laws, while the opposite is true for laws protecting
creditors. Thus, cultural institutions can have signi￿cant explanatory power in regressions
concerning legal outcomes. Indeed, instruments or variables used to represent any one of the
four institutional aspects may have signi￿cant explanatory power with regards to an outcome
of one of the other three aspects, in particular an outcome which may not necessarily be
captured by the intended variable. Therefore, this is further support for the need to try and
control for all aspects of the institutional make-up rather than just for particular e⁄ects.
As discussed previously, it is important not only to ￿nd exogenous instruments but also
to represent the signi￿cant changes seen in the institutional framework over the past few
decades. Whilst the use of these historical instruments is valid and has been justi￿ed, this
approach fails to take into account any contemporary institutional changes or developments.
In order for this to be accomplished in this paper, an instrument to represent contemporary
political institutional change shall be used. The construction of this instrument is highlighted
below.
1.3.3 Construction of the Political Instrument
In many cases in the literature, variables that are used to represent political con-
straints or outcomes su⁄er from one of the aforementioned problems, endogeneity, subjectiv-
ity, measurement error etc. Examples include a large majority of the variables in the Polity
IV and ICRG datasets. However, there is little doubt that political constraints play an im-
portant role with regards to volatility, growth and development, both within and between
nations. Countries with more checks and balances are less likely to allow the executive to
alter policy for reasons other than those relating to the economy. Fatas and Mihov (2005)
run regressions between institutions and policy, showing that political constraints matter
more in rich countries than in poor. In addition, policy volatility has a larger negative e⁄ect
for growth in poorer countries, thus supporting the hypothesis that investment is a channel
through which policy volatility a⁄ects growth. As stated previously, there is also the need
to represent contemporary institutional changes in an exogenous manner.
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Henisz (2002) sets out to ￿nd a link between an objective measure of political con-
straints and cross-national growth rate variation. The constructed variable, POLCON, is
derived from a simple spatial model and relies on the number of independent veto points in
the political system and the distribution of political preferences across and therein6. This
measure is found to be statistically and economically signi￿cant in its impact on growth,
when using OLS, 3SLS and GMM.
There are considerable di⁄erences between this variable and those which has been used
previously to instrument for political constraints. Firstly, POLCON is an objective measure
of constraints and thus does not su⁄er from as many problems with respect to subjectivity
and measurement error. Secondly, this variable contains more information than previous
measures. For example, South and East Asian countries score highly with regards to political
institutional quality on the Polity IV and ICRG datasets but poorly on the POLCON scale7,
due to lack of veto points, strongly aligned and homogenous legislatures and subservient
courts. The events of the East Asian Crisis may therefore go some way to validating the
POLCON approach towards measuring political constraints.
In order, for this variable to be of use (at present it could be assumed that including it any
regressions would introduce endogeneity into model) it will be modi￿ed so as to represent
the existing political constraints at given time relative to the range of these constraints
experienced over the total time series. Hence, the following is used to determine the new





This instrument measures the constraints in a political system present at any one time
relative to the spread of constraints that has been experienced over the complete time series.
This variable is not dependent on the total number of veto points in the same manner as the
POLCON variable. Obviously, systems with a larger number of veto points allow for this
variable to take a greater number of values, but those values will occur over the same span.
Indeed, cross-country comparison is of the form:
Country A is more constrained, relative to its time span of political constraints, than
Country B, relative to its own time span of political constraints.
As such, the total number of veto points and the problem of endogeneity occurring due
to the inclusion of variables of exact political structure are no longer issues for signi￿cant
6For an explicit methodology on the construction of this variable, see Henisz (2002). For an overview,
see Appendix 1.
7Low scores on the POLCON scale constitute poor constraints.
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concern. Furthermore, as this variable captures the changing level of relative political con-
straints it may also re￿ ect contemporary institutional change within a political system. In
essence, it could be said to be an instrument which represents political institutional circum-
stances. By including this instrument in later regressions, it would be hoped that a balance
between historical and contemporary institutions will be reached, allowing for much of the
cross-country variation in the volatility of key macroeconomic variables to be explained.
To summarize, this paper shall utilise; the variables of legal origin and religion, from
LLSV (1997, 1998) and Stulz and Williamson (2003), to instrument for legal and cultural
institutions respectively; the variable of settler mortality and/or population density in 1500,
from AJ (2003), as an instrument for economic institutions and the newly constructed ￿ rela-
tive constraints￿variable to instrument for political institutional change. Thus, instruments
have been found for each aspect of the institutional bundle.
1.3.4 Robustness
There is a necessity to separate the e⁄ects of persistent institutional quality from
the e⁄ects of country speci￿c factors, otherwise regression analysis may be identifying the
e⁄ects of socio-geographic factors such as latitude, access to the sea, weather, language etc.
In essence, by including a set of endogenous control variables, this approach looks to ￿lter
out the e⁄ects of, in panel data terms, country speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Data for the control
variables is obtained from WDI.
1.4 Results
Four measures of macroeconomic volatility have been used to investigate the dif-
fering e⁄ects of unique aspects of the institutional bundle; GDP growth volatility8, private
consumption growth volatility9 volatility of the terms of trade10, and the volatility of the
logarithm of net FDI11. In each case, volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of
the variable of interest, over a thirty ￿ve year period or to the extent that the data allows.
It is acknowledged that volatility over this time period will change for each variable. For
example, it should be expected that economic volatility would be much greater in the 1970￿ s
than at present. However, as this paper is only concerned with cross-country comparisons,
the issue of variability within a country over time is not of concern, it is the di⁄erences in
8Source: Constructed from WDI.
9Source: Constructed from Penn World Tables.
10Source: Constructed from WDI.
11Source: Constructed from WDI.
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variability between countries that is of interest. Tables 1-4 show the results of OLS regression
analysis carried out using the instruments for institutional quality and geographical controls
previously outlined. When independently regressing instruments and volatility, the sample
size varies in each case due to the unbalanced nature of the dataset, which can be attributed
to the sourcing of data. Thus, regressions that include the Settler Mortality variable have
a lower number of observations in comparison to others, as this is by far the smallest data
series available.
In Table 1, it can be seen that legal origin, settler mortality and the Muslim religion are
all signi￿cant when individually regressed with GDP growth volatility. Furthermore, when
only the control variables are regressed with GDP growth volatility, it can be seen that only
the variable for absolute latitude is signi￿cant, and is so at the 5% level. This coe¢ cient is
negative, as would be expected, signifying that a country further from the equator experiences
lower GDP growth volatility. This tallies with contemporary observations of countries within
the tropics experiencing poor economic outcomes and conditions.
Each of the coe¢ cients associated with the signi￿cant variables is of the sign that
might be expected considering previous research. The coe¢ cient of settler mortality is
positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level, suggesting in a given country a higher mortality rate
amongst early European immigrants corresponds to higher volatility in present GDP growth.
When GDP growth volatility is regressed upon each of the institutional instruments and the
control variables, as in regression vi, it can be seen that this relationship persists albeit
with a weaker level of signi￿cance, 10%. However, the signi￿cance of the French legal origin
dummy does not persist from regressions ii to vi. In regression ii, the coe¢ cient is positive
and signi￿cant at the 5% level. This basic observation concurs with those found by Levine
et al, in that a French legal system is detrimental to economic performance in developing
countries in comparison to a British system. This relationship ceases to be signi￿cant in the
larger regression.
With regards to religion, the coe¢ cient of the variable for Muslims is signi￿cant at the
one percent level, whereas the coe¢ cients of the variables for Catholics and Protestants
are insigni￿cant. For an increase of one percentage point of Muslims as percentage of the
population, GDP growth volatility increases by 0.02412 and thus, the greater the percentage
of Muslims in the population, the more volatile is GDP growth, ceteris paribus. Again, as
with the coe¢ cient of legal origin, this relationship is no longer signi￿cant when all dependent
variables are regressed together. This also seems to support previous observations, by and,
that religion as a cultural institution has e⁄ects through aspects of the legal system, as both
the legal system dummy and religious variables are insigni￿cant in the broader regression.
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Table 1.1: Dependent Variable: GDP Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Settler Mort 0.618￿￿￿ 0.381￿
(0.154) (0.202)






















Constant 1.525￿￿ 3.066￿￿￿ 4.016￿￿￿ 3.809￿￿￿ 2.241
(0.751) (0.659) (0.552) (0.374) (1.355)
Observations 67 108 108 97 62
R2 0.199 0.064 0.153 0.008 0.354
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Whereas coe¢ cients become less signi￿cant from the individual instrument regressions
to the broader regression, this is not the case for the relative political constraints variable. In
regression iv, the coe¢ cient associated with this variable is insigni￿cant, yet in the broader
regression it is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level. In regression vi, the coe¢ cient
signi￿es that countries who had relatively fewer political constraints in the past compared to
the present day will su⁄er from higher GDP volatility those would had relatively constrained
politically systems historically. This would support suggests that unconstrained leaders or
political executives can have a detrimental e⁄ect on economic outcomes and checks and
balances within a political system are bene￿cial, see.
The broader regression explains 35.43% of the variation in the data and although there
is little meaning in this statistic alone, it shall be used to make comparisons between the
volatility regressions explored here.
In the premise of the model, it has been shown that the institutional facets that have
a signi￿cant e⁄ect on GDP growth volatility are those associated with good economic insti-
tutions, in particular through the association between settler mortality rates and property
rights, and good political institutions, in particular through the association between political
constraints and good governance.
In Table 2, the same regressors are used as in Table 1 with volatility of consumption as
the dependent variable. In this case, it can be seen that in both the broader regression and
in the regressions using each type of institutional instrument independently, that it is only
the coe¢ cient associated with settler mortality that is signi￿cant in either case.
In regression i, the settler mortality coe¢ cient is positive, as also seen in the GDP
growth volatility regressions, and highly signi￿cant. This relationship is persistent in the
broader regression, the coe¢ cient is still positive at the 1% level and is positive, albeit
slightly lower.
The only other coe¢ cients which display any signi￿cance are those associated with the
control variables. In regression v, where the controls are used independently of any institu-
tional instruments, absolute latitude and the dummy variable for an African country have
associated coe¢ cients which are signi￿cant at the 1% level. In both respects the coe¢ cients
of expected sign; the latitude coe¢ cient is negative and the African coe¢ cient is positive. In
the broader regression, these coe¢ cients cease to be signi￿cant and the negative coe¢ cient
of the Water-to-Land ratio is signi￿cant at the 10% level. This means that in the model,
countries that have a greater proportion of their surface area comprised o⁄ water, ceteris
paribus, experience less consumption growth volatility. Reasons for this could be related to
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Table 1.2: Dependent Variable: Consumption Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Settler Mort 1.756￿￿￿ 1.521￿￿￿
(0.327) (0.501)






















Constant -1.257 3.060￿￿ 5.828￿￿￿ 6.738￿￿￿ 1.933
(1.600) (1.330) (1.271) (0.887) (3.396)
Observations 62 96 96 89 58
R2 0.325 0.077 0.046 0.009 0.429
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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access to trade through waterways, although this is only a tentative suggestion.
As all other coe¢ cient associated with institutional instruments are insigni￿cant in all
regressions in this table, in can be said that the model suggests that it is purely the eco-
nomic facets of the institution bundle that are signi￿cant in determining consumption growth
volatility. Indeed, they seem to have a strong explanatory e⁄ect as the coe¢ cient associated
with settler mortality is highly signi￿cant in a regression equation that explains 42.88% of
the variation in cross-country consumption growth volatility, a ￿gure much higher than in
the previous set of regressions.
This seemingly strong relationship economic facets and consumption growth volatility
may be due to the e⁄ectiveness of property rights. Countries with previously higher settler
mortality rates are much more likely to have poorly developed property rights. It may very
well be the case that households in these economies do not save as, due to the threat of
expropriation of assets, a rational decision maker may choose to consume a much greater
proportion of income. This results in a lack of consumption smoothing, a breakdown of
the permanent income hypothesis and volatility in consumption growth. Other institutional
factors may have little bearing in this hypothetical, yet highly plausible, scenario.
In Table 3, regressions i to iv show that when using institutional instruments indepen-
dently in the volatility of terms of trade regressions, it is only the political instrument that is
insigni￿cant and remains so in the broader regression, iv. In regressions i and iii, the coe¢ -
cients of settler mortality and percentage of Muslims present in the population are positive,
and thus consistent with previous results suggesting positive relationships with volatility,
and signi￿cant at levels of 10% and 5% respectively.
However, both of these coe¢ cients are insigni￿cant in the broader regression, vi. Interest-
ingly, when included as the sole dependent variable the coe¢ cient for the French legal origin
dummy is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level, yet in the broader regression equation is
negative and signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Although seemingly strange, this may be due to the inclusion of more developed, non-
former colonies in observations of regression ii, which are then subsequently dropped when
running the broader regression in the most part due to a lack of a corresponding settler
mortality statistic. For a former colony however, the model suggest that an economy having
a French Legal origin relative to any other, reduces the volatility of the terms of trade.
In regression v, it can be seen that absolute latitude again has a signi￿cant and negative
sign, but this does not remain in the broader regression. Here it is also suggested that larger
countries experience more terms of trade volatility, an e⁄ect that is present in the broader
regression. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient of the Water-to-Land ratio variable is negative and
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Table 1.3: Dependent Variable: Terms of Trade Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Settler Mort 3.305￿ 0.994
(1.891) (2.871)






















Constant 8.537 12.15￿ 11.09￿￿ 18.70￿￿￿ -13.63
(9.257) (6.695) (5.260) (4.395) (18.98)
Observations 62 93 93 86 58
R2 0.048 0.054 0.087 0.006 0.258
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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signi￿cant at the 10% level. These two results may be associated with access to trade; larger
countries are more likely to have populations and markets situated further from international
borders and countries with greater access to waterways are more likely to be linked to trade
routes along those channels. It is reasonable to expect countries with more frequent trade
occurrences to experience lower terms of trade volatility.
The coe¢ cient of the variable of percentage of Catholics present in the population is
positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level in both the narrow and broader regressions. As pre-
viously stated, contemporary research suggests that religion has an e⁄ect on certain aspects
of the legal system. The regression equation, vi, can readily be interpreted as suggesting
that the institutional factors that are signi￿cant in determining terms of trade volatility are
aspects of the legal system and that also access to trade plays a signi￿cant role12.
In table 4, all coe¢ cients associated with institutional instruments are insigni￿cant, with
the exception of the coe¢ cient of the variable of percentage of Protestants present in the
population. This is negative and signi￿cant at the 1% level in both the narrow and broad
regression equation. This suggests that having a higher percentage of Protestants in the
population leads to a signi￿cant decline in the volatility of the log of net foreign direct
investment.
Again, it may be tentatively suggested that the negative correlation between net FDI
volatility and the variable for the percentage of Protestants has its roots in trust between
the nations involved. Much of the world￿ s FDI investment will originate from the largest
economies, such as Germany, the US, UK and France. Given that these countries are mainly
comprised of Protestants it may be that an implicit trust exists between these investor
nations and the recipient countries due to common religious preferences13.
12The relationship between access to trade and the volatility of terms of trade may be an interesting area
of future research. It particular, what are the factors that determine trade frequency between countries and
how does this frequency impact on the volatility of terms of trade.
13For more on trust and economic outcomes, see Guiso et al (2006) amongst others.
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Table 1.4: Dependent Variable: FDI Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Settler Mort -0.0718 -0.109
(0.0607) (0.0729)






















Constant 1.898￿￿￿ 1.559￿￿￿ 1.683￿￿￿ 1.567￿￿￿ 1.253￿￿
(0.303) (0.117) (0.131) (0.110) (0.594)
Observations 71 135 133 113 66
R2 0.020 0.012 0.060 0.002 0.331
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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1.5 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated the importance of trying to isolate and to recognize
the varying e⁄ects of di⁄ering aspects of the institutional bundle. Using exogenous, objective
instruments to represent economic, legal, political and cultural facets of ￿ institutions￿ , results
have shown that each of these instruments were signi￿cant in explaining a certain type of
economic volatility. In summary, it seems that economic and political aspects have signif-
icant impacts on GDP growth volatility, economic and aspects have signi￿cant impacts on
consumption growth volatility, legal and cultural aspects have signi￿cant impacts on terms
on trade volatility and that cultural aspects have a signi￿cant impact on net FDI volatility.
Although speculative suggestions have been proposed to explain these patterns, perhaps the
most important thing which maybe be taken from these results is the following. It is no
longer acceptable to aggregate the e⁄ects of di⁄ering institutional facets into one bundle
that in turn is represented, or instrumented for, by a subjective measure of institutional
quality. In terms of policy, declustering the institutional bundle and targeting speci￿c areas
may be much more e⁄ective than having a general form of ￿ institutional reform￿policy.
Furthermore, if it is accepted, as above, that volatility is detrimental to long term eco-
nomic growth (or indeed has any signi￿cant e⁄ect whatsoever), then a speci￿c type of eco-
nomic volatility may be dampened by policy targeted at the appropriate institutional facet.
Thus, more clinical policy in the area of institutions with have positive a⁄ects on long term
economic growth.
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1.6 Appendix A: Constructing POLCON
1.6.1 Methodology
If a spatial model, which allows for cross-country comparisons between large numbers
of countries, is to be constructed there is a need to simplify the structure of political systems.
However, those aspects of the political composition that are fundamental to the restriction
of political change must be largely retained. The focus of the constructed measure will be
on two such aspects: the number of veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution
of preferences of the political actors that function therein.
It is assumed that political actors function within ￿ve key areas: the Executive (E),
the Lower House of the Legislature (L1), the Upper House of the Legislature (L2), sub-
Federal units (F) and the Judiciary (J). Each actors holds a preference, XI, where I 2
[E;L1;L2;F;J], i.e. I represents one of the ￿ve given political institutions. There exists a
status quo policy, X0, and actors￿preferences are identically and independently drawn from
a one-dimensional and uniformly distributed policy space [0,1]. It is assumed that a political
actor has a utility function given by:
U = ￿jX ￿ XIj U~[￿1;0]
where X represents the policy outcome.
Furthermore, each actor has veto power over ￿nal policy decisions.
The measure of interest from this model is the extent to which a political actor is con-
strained in their choice of future policies. This variable is calculated as one minus the
expected range of policies for which a change in the status quo policy can be agreed by all
actors with veto power. If there exists an unchecked executive, they may always achieve pol-
icy outcome XE, regardless of status quo policy, and is guaranteed level of utility 0. Thus,
political constraints, calculated as one minus political discretion, are zero. Obviously, as
the number of political actors with independent veto power increases so to does the level of
political constraint.
Drawing on the assumptions regarding draws from the distribution, the preferences of
political actors will exhibit the following expected di⁄erence, 1=(n + 2) , where n is the
number of political actors.
If it is assumed that there are only two actors in the political system, i.e. an Executive
and a unicameral legislature, the expected preference di⁄erence is equal to 0.25. There
exists six possible preference orderings of this game [see ￿gure (a) below], each assumed to
be equally likely. In two of these orderings, actors￿preferences are spaced so that there
is no policy outside of the status quo that both actors simultaneously prefer. Otherwise,
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orderings give a closed form solution other than the status quo, the direction of which both
actors agree on. However, without other ￿ rules of the game￿that are country speci￿c (such
as movement order or relative costs) the exact value of the jointly preferred policy cannot be
determined. Therefore, the measure of policy discretion used is the range of policy outcomes
that are jointly preferred to the status quo. The expected level of political constraints for
the game fXE;XL1gacross the six possible orderings is 2/3.
This measure is based solely on the number of institutionalised (de jure) veto points and
the assumption of uniformity of preference distribution. In order to incorporate de facto
veto power into the model, information on the preferences, or alignment, of the various
political actors is incorporated. For example, if the legislature were completely aligned with
the Executive, the game then achieves the outcome in the original example, the Executive
always achieves XEand political constraints equal zero.
The composition of political branches needs to be taken into consider in cases when
branches are neither completely aligned nor completely independent. Suppose that a legisla-
ture is dominated by an Executive-controlling party, then political constraints are negatively
correlated with the size of this majority. In contrast, if a party opposing that which controls
the Executive holds a legislative majority, then political constraints are positively correlated
with the size of this majority. Furthermore, if the legislature consists of a large number of
parties, i.e. is heavily fractionalised, this may lead to fewer constraints due to the di¢ culty
in forming or maintaining coalition opposition. Thus, political constraint measures should
include information on both partisan alignment and di¢ culty of coalition formation.
The probability that two random draws from a political branch are from di⁄erent parties










where n is the number of parties, ni represents the number of seats held by the ith
party and N is the total number of seats. The ￿nal value of political constraints in a
system where the branch is aligned with the Executive is thus equal to basic constraint
value derived under complete alignment of the Executive and other political branches, plus
the product of the fractionalisation index and the di⁄erence between basic constraint values
under complete alignment and complete independence. In the case of the Executive party
being in the minority , the constraint measure is calculate using a modi￿ed product term,
of [1- fractionalisation index] and the di⁄erence in extreme basic constraint values. In cases
of mixed alignment, a weighed sum of the two products is used.
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Calculations were carried out for 157 countries over the period 1960 to 1994 and averages
over ￿ve year periods were taken.
1.6.2 Data Sources
Construction of a measure of political constraints based on the methodology de-
scribed herein requires three types of data. First, information regarding the number of
institutional players in a given polity; second, data on partisan alignments (including coali-
tions) across institutions; and ￿nally, data on the party composition of legislatures. All
countries were assumed to have an executive. Data on the existence of other political actors
(unicameral and bicameral legislatures and sub-federal units) with substantive veto power
was taken from the Polity database [see Gurr (1996)] and Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996).
The above data sources were then supplemented by various issues of The Political Hand-
book of the World and The Statesman￿ s Yearbook to note the party distribution of the
legislature(s): speci￿cally, whether the executive enjoy a majority a majority in one (or
both) legislature(s) and how many seats in each legislature were controlled by each party.
Based on this information, the values of institutional hazards were modi￿ed to form a pre-
liminary measures of political constraints (POLCON) using the methodology described in
the previous section.




DIVERSIFICATION IN PRIMARY COMMODITY
PRODUCTION
2.1 Introduction
For many years, key international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank encouraged Least Developed Countries1 to adopt a policy of Import
Substitution Industrialisation2. This policy stance involved supporting strategic substitute
producing domestic industries through subsidisation, creating disincentives for foreign direct
investment, maintaining an overvalued currency and erecting tari⁄s as barriers to imports.
Both in conception and enactment, this policy has been found to be wanting when it comes
to addressing the needs of many LDCs. Although some countries experienced a degree of
success with ISI, it is noticeable that these countries (e.g. Mexico, Argentina and Brazil)
initially possessed generally higher living standards and larger domestic markets than would
be typically associated with an LDC. Speci￿cally, it has been argued that Africa￿ s ISI policy
failed due to lack of complimentary factors, namely education and infrastructure. As such,
comparative advantage in those countries remained in the primary commodity producing
sectors (Deaton, 1999). Indeed, it is due to the lack of these complimentary factors that
seem to rule out the type of export orientated industrialisation policy that has been so
successful in the Far East.
The theoretical basis for the policy of ISI was the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis3 which
states that there is a long term decline in real primary commodity prices relative to manu-
factures. However, more contemporary literature (Cuddington 1992, Diakosavvas and Scan-
dizzo 1992, Bleaney and Greenaway,1993 etc.) which has, by using modern econometric
methods, disputed this theory, showing that the presence of a trend is highly dependent on
the data series used and that the data maybe be better explained by a single structural break.
Accordingly, this paper proposes that the key issue of concern to LDCs, which are heavily
reliant on the export of primary commodities, should not be any long term, relative decline
as outlined by Prebisch and Singer but the highly volatile nature of commodity prices. The
1Henceforth, LDCs.
2Henceforth, ISI.
3Independently, Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950).
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implications of this type of volatility are widespread (Bidarkota and Crucini 2000, Blattman
et al 2007, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2007 etc) and arguably have been one of the most
fundamental causes in prohibiting development in poor countries.
This paper proposes a policy of diversi￿cation across primary commoditity production
as a means, along the lines of modern portfolio theory, of dampening the e⁄ects of highly
volatile commodity prices in LDCs. It is argued here that diversi￿cation would lead to an
export bundle of primary commodities that provide a more stable income base for developing
economies, which is especially important when considering the inability of governments to
forecast commodity prices or suitably adjust ￿scal policies to short-term commodity windfalls
(Tornell and Lane, 1999). Furthermore, there is a vicious cycle associated with primary com-
modity price volatility and development, as the various methods through which economies
could try to tackle this type of volatility are often lacking in LDCs due to a lack of ￿nancial
development. As the expertise or infrastructure to create entities such as sovereign wealth
funds is unavailable, this paper suggests that diversi￿cation across primary commodity pro-
duction can act as a substitute for ￿nancial development in controlling volatility for those
countries with the most poorly established economies.
Notably, diversi￿cation is not used in this paper as a byword for industrialisation. Na-
tions that have a smaller proportion of primary industry, in comparison to secondary or
tertiary sectors, tend to attain a better standard of economic development than others.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) ￿nds the fraction of primary exports in GDP to be negatively corre-
lated with growth and this is an area which has been extensively researched. This is duly
noted and is taken as given. The primary hypothesis of this paper is that when the size
of the primary sector is control for, developing countries that exhibit diversi￿cation across
the primary commodity sector will enjoy better economic conditions, speci￿cally decreasing
terms of trade volatility which can in turn promote GDP growth.
Finally, insofar as this paper also constitutes a policy recommendation, it has been
highlighted above that long-term factors such as education and infrastructure need to be ad-
dressed in order for industrialisation to be successful. As these factors are often conspicuous
by their absence in LDCs, this would imply that the size of the primary sector is relatively
persisistent, due to the time it takes for factor accumulation. Diversi￿cation is therefore a
means of addressing a primary sector of a given size but, importantly, is not o⁄ered as a
long term alternative to industrialisation.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 surveys the literature, section 3
outlines the nature of the proposed solution, section 4 presents empirical analysis and section
5 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Overview
2.2.1 On the Behaviour of Commodity Prices
A typical LDC will be heavily reliant on the export of primary commodities as a
source of income and a large part of the capital and labour resources of that country will
be devoted to the production of those commodities. The integral issue of the problem is the
manner in which governments of LDCs react to volatile commodity price movements and in
what part public policy is geared up to accommodating primary product price ￿ uctuations.
Understanding the behaviour and e⁄ects of commodity prices will be critical to the success
of the country and there has been much academic focus on this issue.
Firstly, commodity prices seem to display some similar characteristics; Deaton and
Laroque (1992) ￿nds signi￿cant second order auto-correlation, low persistence, positive skew-
ness4 and largely positive kurtosis5. Secondly, Deaton and Laroque (1992) strongly rejects
the random walk hypothesis of commodity prices6 and this rejection calls into question the
public policy behaviour demonstrated by countries particularly reliant on income generated
by primary commodities. Tornell and Lane (1999) highlights notable cases, such as Costa
Rica and the Ivory Coast during the co⁄ee prices shocks of 1975, of a negative correlation
between a country￿ s terms of trade and its current account. This implies that countries
have a tendency to overspend received windfalls, even in cases where windfalls are induced
by temporary shocks7. Reasons for this overspending are likely to include poor quality or
undisciplined ￿scal policy, corruption and political rent seeking. This problem is perhaps ac-
centuated by policymakers making poor predictions8 on the movements of commodity prices;
a task not aided by high volatility.
The inability to forecast commodity prices is not a problem that is con￿ned to govern-
ments and policymakers in developing countries either. Figures 1-29 show that often, those
global institutions that o⁄er ￿ expertise￿can themselves be wildly wrong about future price
movements of the main sources of income for developing economies.
In short, commodity prices exhibit infrequent, positive spikes that have low persistence,
such that these shocks cannot be considered permanent. However, governments in developing
4There are relatively few downward spikes in comparison to upward spikes.
5The variance is caused largely by occasional, but more extreme, deviations from the mean.
6A true random walk would achieve a level of persistence equal to unity. Deaton and Laroque (1992)
￿nd a value closer to 0.3.
7This also holds when the nature of the shock is common knowledge. For instance, the spike in co⁄ee
prices during 1975 was caused by a severe frost which devastated Brazil￿ s co⁄ee crop in July of that year.
The world price doubled overnight and in the following weeks reached up to eight times the pre-frost level.
8See Collier et al. (1999).
9Source: Deaton and Miller (1995)
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Figure 2.1: World Bank Co⁄ee Price Forecasts
Figure 2.2: World Bank Cotton Price Forecasts
countries often treat these shocks as highly persistent and adjusting ￿scal policy accordingly,
even overspending temporary windfalls. As a result, it has been suggested that, essentially
temporary, higher commodity prices may in fact be detrimental to countries that rely on
primary products for a substantial part of their income, not just in terms of volatility but
also in terms of the policy approach to any upward change (Asea and Lahiri, 1999).
Whilst it is clear to see how volatility of commodity prices can have adverse e⁄ects for
LDCs, the long term trend in prices is of key importance in the argument presented here.
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis states that there is a long-term decline in the real price of
primary commodities relative to manufactures. Essentially, it is this hypothesis that has been
the theoretic basis for the policy of ISI. At ￿rst, any policy recommendation that advocates
focusing on the production of primary commodities would seem, in light of this hypothesis,
to be contracting LDCs to generations of worsening impoverishment. However, this paper
suggests that the issue of long-term relative price decline of primary commodities should
be of secondary, or even little, concern to LDC in comparison to primary commodity price
volatility. While this hypothesis gained much support from its inception, more advanced
econometric analysis in later years cast substantial doubt over its observations. Cudding-
ton (1992) refutes the existence of widespread e⁄ects as prescribed by the Plebisch-Singer
hypothesis, suggesting that secular deterioration in primary commodity prices should not
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be considered a universal phenomenon or as a stylised fact. Diakosavvas and Scandizzo
(1992) ￿nds evidence that the hypothesis holds for only a handful of primary commodities.
Furthermore, Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) demonstrates that if data prior to the mid
1920s is excluded from the analysis of real commodity prices relative to manufactures, then
a structural break in the early 1980s ￿ts the data better than a smooth trend. They conclude
that price instability is a more serious issue than long-term decline in the terms of trade,
particularly from the perspective of those countries which are heavily dependent on a narrow
range of primary commodity exports.
2.2.2 On the Importance and E⁄ects of Volatility on Growth
It should be stressed that commodity price volatility has real e⁄ects on the growth
rate of economies, not just through the medium of policy or corruption. Blattman et al (2007)
demonstrates that countries with a greater volatility of primary product prices grow more
slowly relative to other primary product exporters. Bidarkota and Crucini (2000) show that
when holding ￿xed the total share of raw materials in national exports, the most important
factor in terms of trade variation is the price volatility of the particular commodities in which
a country specializes. Indeed, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2007) suggests that the natural
resource curse is driven by an indirect negative e⁄ect of natural resource abundance; an e⁄ect
transmitted by volatility and one which is strong enough to outweigh any direct positive
e⁄ect associated with the presence of abundant natural resources. The same paper shows
that countries with less well developed ￿nancial systems are much more volatile; countries in
the bottom quartile of ￿nancial development have a standard deviation of annual per capita
GDP growth two percent higher than those in the top quartile. Elbers et al (2007) carries
out a DSGE case study of Zimbabwe, ￿nding that ￿nancial market incompleteness and
observed commodity price volatility depresses capital accumulation and output by around
forty percent. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) cites the fact that poor countries specialise in
fewer industries as one of the four reasons why poor countries experience higher volatility in
growth rates.
Given the problems highlighted above, it would seem that volatility reduction should be
a key goal of developing economies. The development of more complex domestic ￿nancial
markets would provide mechanisms that could reduce the e⁄ects of volatility by allowing
for those economies to self-insure. This could be done through participation in long term
contracts, hedging, investment in sovereign funds etc. Speci￿cally, in the case of terms of
trade volatility, ￿nancial development may act as a constraint of government policy insofar
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as when a primary commodity price spikes, a government response is limited by developed
￿nancial markets either because powers have been devolved to those markets or the presence
of those markets results in ￿ more responsible￿actions. In the latter case, it could be argued
that the outcome is akin to a type of debt overhang or similar ￿ watchdog￿e⁄ect. If the
ability to respond ￿scally is constrained then the tendency to overspend windfalls, as noted
by Tornell and Lane (1999), will also be appropriately limited. As terms of trade is measured
as the value of exports relative to the value of imports, if the change in the value of imports
overshoots the change in the value of exports due to a temporary price shock, as in Tornell
and Lane (1999), this will lead to increased terms of trade volatility. Dampening overshooting
will thus lead to lower terms of trade volatility.
However, LDCs will almost certainly lack the complex ￿nancial markets, or the ability to
quickly generate them, which would enable these economies to take the appropriate measures.
Thus, as a solution this paper will turn to diversi￿cation across the production of primary
commodities as a means of dampening volatility.
2.3 On the Nature of the Proposed Solution
From Modern Portfolio Theory, it is known that increasing the number of stocks
held in a given portfolio can reduce the volatility of the portfolio. An investor can reduce
portfolio risk simply by holding instruments which are not perfectly correlated. In other
words, investors can reduce their exposure to individual asset risk by holding a diversi￿ed
portfolio of assets. E¢ ciently applied diversi￿cation will allow for the same expected portfolio
return with reduced risk exposure. The same logic is appealed to in order to suggest a
reduction in the price volatility of an export bundle.
By diversifying across the production of primary commodities, national income becomes
less dependent on the price movements of a single commodity. Bleaney and Greenaway
(1993) shows that there is very little co-movement in commodity prices and where these
co-movements do exist it is often, bizarrely, across very di⁄erent types of commodities, e.g.
wheat and lead. Although commodity prices exhibit similar characteristics, there seems
to be very imperfect correlation across commodity prices and under the previously stated
assumptions, it would appear that diversi￿cation across production could be bene￿cial to
LDCs.
This policy would seem, however, to be completely at odds to the conclusions of the
most fundamental of trade of models (Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin) and limit the oppor-
tunity for poor countries to achieve the economies of scale associated with specialisation.
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With regards to the former, these models advocate production, or specialisation, along the
lines of comparative advantage. As this paper will endorse diversi￿cation across the primary
commodity sector, LDCs would still be participating in labour intensive industries and thus
would be ful￿lling the conclusions of these models. It would remain though that diversi￿-
cation would inhibit the achievement of economies of scale and so a policy of diversi￿cation
would lead to costs in terms of forgone gains from specialisation. Yet the Lewis Critique10
would suggest that developing countries do not realise these gains anyhow. The critique
states that real wages cannot grow, even in the presence of productivity increases, if there
exists a (theoretically) unlimited supply of labour at the subsistence wage. The bene￿ts of
technological progress therefore accrue to consumers in industrialised countries rather than
workers. This would seem to be a plausible ￿t for many LDCs and the e⁄ect is reinforced
by the fact that in many cases capital is foreign owned.
A key question that must be addressed is whether or not diversi￿cation, in terms of the
actual physical ability of an economy to produce a wider range of primary products, is a
plausible policy recommendation. The two most immediate problems would seem to be ge-
ography and availability of primary mineral resources. Obviously, countries cannot diversify
by producing mineralogical primary commodities if no ore is present within the country￿ s
territory and the range of ￿ renewable￿primary commodities that can be feasibly produced
within a country will be a⁄ected by geography. Firstly, the majority of primary commodities
taken into account in the WTA database11 are not primary mineral commodities and so there
is much scope for diversi￿cation across renewable primary commodities. The Government
of Angola has recently announced a 5 year, $6 billion dollar agricultural program aimed at
reducing the nation￿ s reliance on oil and diamonds. Secondly, geography can, for many rea-
sons, greatly a⁄ect transportation costs associated with exportation; size of country, access
to waterways, landlocking, mountainous terrain, distance from nearest port etc. However,
even in the more extreme cases this has not prevented countries from diversifying, albeit
when previously forced to, e.g. Colombia￿ s move away from tobacco production when faced
with low cost competition from Indonesia and Brazil￿ s shift from natural rubber in response
to Malaysian competition and the invention of sythentics.
Furthermore, as stated above diversi￿cation as described here may be e⁄ective in control-
ling volatility in economies that lack the channels that ￿nancial development would otherwise
allow. Diversi￿cation will reduce the importance of a single commodity in the country￿ s ex-
port bundle and as commodities do not typically exhibit signi￿cant co-movements, price
10See Lewis (1954)
11For the list of commodities used in this paper, see Appendix A
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spikes of a single commodity will not have as great e⁄ect on the price of the total bundle.
This implies that revenue will be ￿ atter, more predictable and will not give rise to as many
occasions when governments overspend. Therefore, terms of trade volatility may be reduced.
On the face of it, diversi￿cation across the primary commodity sector would seem to be
a feasible solution to some of the key issues facing LDCs, particularly exposure to primary
commodity price volatility. Empirical analysis is presented to support this assertion.
2.4 Empirics
2.4.1 Diversi￿cation as a dampener to Volatility
This paper uses cross country regressions to investigate the relationship between
terms of trade volatility and diversi￿cation across primary product production. All data is
from the World Trade Analyzer unless otherwise stated. Initially, the regression speci￿cation
is as follows:
￿i = ￿ + ￿1NPCi;s;t + ￿2Ri;t + ￿Di;t + ’Zi + "i;t
The dependent variable, ￿i, is the volatility of terms of trade for country i and is mea-
sured as the standard deviation of a terms of trade index12 over the period 1985 to 2007.
NPCi;s;tis the number of primary commodities that the country i produces in year t which
have an export share greater than or equal to the speci￿ed threshold, s. Di⁄erent threshhold
levels were used to check to robustness of the model; 1%, 2.5% and 5% of total exports.
These levels were chosen so that there would exist su¢ cient variation between countries in
the data without including commodities with negligable export signi￿cance. Ri;t measures
the ratio of values of primary sector exports to all exports13. Di;t encapsulates two eco-
nomic control variables. Firstly, openness as measured by exports as a fraction of GDP and
secondly, the log of GDP14. Zt captures a number of geographic and institutional controls;
log of land area, water-to-land ratio, average elevation, a dummy for being landlocked, per-
centage of population living in a Koeppen-Geiger temperate zone15, a dummy variable for
African countries, a dummy variable indicating French legal origin16 and the percentage of
the population recognised as Catholics in 198017. Most of these controls are standard in the
12Source: World Development Indicators (WDI)
13Results tables display this variable as P/Ex Ratio
14Source: WDI. This measure of GDP was used so as to capture the ￿ size of domestic market￿e⁄ect which
enabled some economies to be successful under ISI policies.
15Source: CID, General Measures of Geography
16Source: La Porta et al (1999)
17Source: La Porta et al (1999)
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literature and studies often ￿nd geography has signi￿cant e⁄ects on volatility (Malik and
Temple, 2005). Institutional controls are limited to legal origin and religion as in previous
work18 these have been shown to be more frequently signi￿cant, than political or economic
institutional facets, in explaining di⁄erences in terms of trade volatility.
The above speci￿cation is run using the three di⁄erent threshhold levels and four di⁄erent
years; 1987, 1990, 1995 and 2000. Collating this data as a single dynamic panel was not
possible due to the unbalanced nature of the data available and earlier years are used, with
respect to the range of volatility, to limit potential endogeneity. Results of these regressions
are shown in Tables 1-4.
From Table (1), it can be seen that at each threshhold value and using the prescribed
controls, the coe¢ cients of interest are strongly signi￿cant and appear with the expected sign.
Results show, in accordance with the literature cited above, that an economy with a larger
share of primary commodity in exports will experience signi￿cantly higher volatility in its
terms of trade. Again, it is this result that has been the driving force behind industrialisation
policies aimed at LDCs in the past. Also, openness can play a signi￿cant role in reducing
terms of trade volatility. Most importantly, these results support the hypothesis of this
paper; that an increase in the number of primary commodities produced can lower terms
of trade volatility, as the coe¢ cient at each threshhold level is strongly signi￿cant and a
negative. Indeed, as the threshhold, s, is lowered, it can be seen that the explanatory power
of the diversi￿cation variable increases, from regressions (4) through (6), as the p-value
decreases and the explanatory power of the speci￿cation as a whole increases markedly. To
argue that this is a result of the inclusion of more data would be wrong. Lowering the
threshhold allows for more variation across countries in the number of primary products in
exports, which may be important if insu¢ cient variation exists in the data if the threshhold
is set too high. However, this risks including commodities with levels of production that
would seem insigni￿cant. Clearly, the latter is not occuring here so it seems therefore,
that diversi￿cation on a relatively small-scale may be conducive to lowering terms of trade
volatility. Furthermore, crude analysis of these results suggests that producing and exporting
an additional primary commodity, so that its export share surpasses the 1% threshold, can
reduce terms of trade volatility as, ceteris paribus, the dampening e⁄ect of diversi￿cation will
outweigh the stimulating e⁄ect of increasing the ratio of primary commodities in exports. The
features of these results are quite robust to changes in year as can be seen from comparisions
of Tables 1-4.
18See Mott, "A Further Unbundling of Institutions" 2008
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2.4.2 Robustness
2.4.2.1 Endogeneity
In order to test for the presence of serious endogeneity in the speci￿cation used
above, volatility of terms of trade data is used as an explanatory variable, the number of
primary commodities is used as the dependent variable and standard controls are included.
The speci￿cation is as follows:
NPCi;s;t = ￿ + ￿1￿e;i + ￿Di;t + ’Zi + "i;t
where all variables have the same de￿nition as previously stated and ￿e;i is the volatility
of a country￿ s terms of trade, measured as the standard deviation of a terms of trade index
over the period 1980 to 1990. The regression is run six times using the previous primary
commodity export share threshholds as before and data for the years 1995 and 2000. These
time periods were chosen as it is assumed that any a⁄ect from volatility on production would
not be instantaneous due to relatively inelastic supply. From the results seen in Table 5,
there is strong evidence to reject serious endogeneity in the original speci￿cation as in ￿ve
of the six regressions, terms of trade volatility does not prove to be signi￿cant19.
2.4.2.2 Diversi￿cation Measure
The measure of diversi￿cation used in the speci￿cations above is intentionally simple,
so as to highlight the strength of the result. In order to qualify the preceding results, that
terms of trade volatility may be dampened by diversi￿cation across primary commodity







where, for the purposes of this paper, N is the number of commodities and c is the
export share. The lower the value of the Her￿ndahl Index, the more diversi￿ed the primary
commodity exports of a given economy. A normalised version of this index, Hi;t, is used as
the diversi￿cation measure, so the speci￿cation is as follows:
￿i = ￿ + ￿1Hi;t + ￿2Ri;t + ￿Di;t + ’Zi + "i;t
This speci￿ction is run once for each of the four years of the initial speci￿cation.
19Interestingly, religion is strongly signi￿cant in all six of the regressions in Table 5.
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Tables 6-9 show that, even when using a more complex measure of diveri￿cation, the results
support the hypothesis that diversi￿cation (in this case de￿ned as lower concentrations of
any given commodity in the primary commodities share of exports) is associated with lower
terms of trade volatility. In each of the four regressions, strongly signi￿cant and positive
Her￿ndhal Index coe¢ cients show that, in the data, terms of trade volatility increases with
the concentration of commodities which constitute primary exports.
2.4.3 Diversi￿cation as a Financial Development Substitute
The second part of the hypothesis of this paper is that diversi￿cation across
primary commodity production can act as not only as a dampener of terms of trade volatility
but can act also as a substitute for ￿nancial development in the least economically developed
nations. In order to test this hypothesis, the following speci￿cation is used:
￿i = ￿ + ￿1NPCi;s;t + ￿2FNi;s;t + ￿3Fi;t + ￿4Ri;t + ￿5Xi;t + ’Zi + "i;t
where NPCi;s;t, Ri;t and Zi have the same de￿nitions as before. Fi;t is the country￿ s level
of ￿nancial development20, measured by the level of domestic credit to the private sector
as a percentage of GDP21. FNi;s;t is an interactive variable22 between ￿nancial development
and the number of primary commodities with an export share greater than s. Xi;t represents
openness as measured by exports as a fraction of GDP. This speci￿cation does not include
GDP as an explanatory due to the possibility of high collinearity with the variables of
interest.
Tables 10-13 show the results from these regressions, using the same four time pe-
riods and two primary export share threshhold levels; 1% and 2.5%. Using the two lowest
threshhold levels ensures adequate variation in the data as discussed above. For 1987, the
model performs poorly in terms of the newly introduced ￿nancial development variables;
neither achieve signi￿cance at either of the primary commodity export share threshholds. It
is di¢ cult to make comparisons from samples using 1987 data and other years due to the
unbalanced nature of the data. However, the ￿nancial variables of interest perform well in
the other regressions; in ￿ve of the six regressions both variables, ￿nancial development and
the interactive variable between ￿nancial develoment and diversi￿cation are signi￿cant and
20Results tables display this variable as Fin Dev
21Source: WDI
22Results tables display the interactive variable as FDNPC1 at the 1% threshhold and FDNPC2 at the
2.5% threshhold.
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have the expected signs. The results suggest that increased levels of ￿nancial development
are associated with lower levels of terms of trade volatility, the associated coe¢ cient being
negative. It should be noted that, ceteris paribus, this e⁄ect does not crowd-out the signi￿-
cance of diversi￿cation as in all six regressions this variable remains strongly signi￿cant and
negative. However, the interactive variable between diversi￿cation is signi￿cant in each of
the regressions in which the variable for ￿nancial development is signi￿cant. The positive
coe¢ cient of the interactive variable implies that there is a diminising return to diversi￿ca-
tion in terms of ￿nancial development; the higher the initial level of ￿nancial development,
the lower the e⁄ect on terms of trade volatility of increasing diversi￿cation. Furthermore,
there should exist a level of ￿nancial development for which increasing diversi￿cation of pri-




= ￿1 + ￿2Fi;t = 0






These critical levels are calculated for each regression in which the ￿nancial development
achieve signi￿cance. When the export share threshhold, s, is set at 2.5%, critical levels of
￿nancial development are 83.70, 71.00 and 83.32 for the years 2000, 1995 and 1990 respec-
tively, with an average of 82.82. For s = 0:01, critical levels are 95.34 and 70.29 for years
2000 and 1995, averaging 79.34. In the data for the year 2000, countries such as Jordon
(77.81), Grenada (79.27) and St. Lucia (80.07) all have similar levels of ￿nancial devel-
opment to the averages of the critical levels calculated here23. The majority of countries
in the data have ￿nancial development levels signi￿cantly below this, with only the Asian
Tigers and First World economics achieving consistently higher levels. These ￿gures seem
to support the secondary hypothesis of this paper insofar as the average critical levels are
reassuring high. Under this speci￿cation, diversi￿cation continues to be a viable policy for
dampening terms of trade volatility and acts as a substitute for ￿nancial development until
an economy has achieved an above average level of ￿nancial development. Thus, the poorest,
most under-developed economies seem most able to bene￿t from increased diversi￿cation
across primary commodity production.
23Incidently, these countries also share very similar HDI values: Jordan (0.773), St Lucia (0.795) and
Genada (0.777).
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Notice that this simple speci￿cation suggests that for any level of ￿nancial development
beyond the critical level of ￿nancial development, F ￿
i;t, then diversi￿cation across primary
commodities can lead to an increase in terms of trade volatility. In essence, there exists a
La⁄er curve, in terms of ￿nancial development, to explain the relationship between diversi￿-
cation and terms of trade volatility. Whilst this is an inevitable consequence of the regression
speci￿cation, it may be valid to suggest that beyond a critical level that diversi￿cation has no
e⁄ect in practice and that this critical level of ￿nancial development signals the point when
the Lewis Critique begins to break down. As economies become more developed, labour
markets tighten, there exists greater opportunities for capital investment by domestic agents
and ￿nancial development, by the same measure used in this paper, increases. Consequently,
real wages will rise, the propensity for gains from specialisation to accrue to foreign agents
diminishes and this will impact on domestic consumption, the demand for imports and ul-
timately, the terms of trade structure. Therefore, in this scenario, if specialisation leads to
less volatility in terms of trade movements, a policy of diversi￿cation may increase volatility
in terms of trade if ￿nancial development has exceeded a certain threshhold. This however,
is only a tentative suggestion and is a question left for future research.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper has argued that the foremost concern of LDCs that are heavily reliant
on the export of primary commodities should not be the long term decline in real commodity
prices, as prescribed by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. Previous literature, using more ad-
vanced econometric techniques, has provided evidence that this long term decline is in fact
a fallacy and that the data is better explained by the occurrence of, at most, two structural
breaks in the data. Instead it is the volatility of primary commodity prices that should be of
chief concern. Presented empirics have shown that a policy of diversi￿cation in the produc-
tion of primary commodities can play an important role in directly dampening terms of trade
volatility. The intuition is simple: that diversi￿cation reduces reliance on a single commodity
and if commodity prices are not perfectly correlated, modern portfolio theory suggests the
possibility of constructing an array of primary commodity exports with the same return and
lower variance. There is strong evidence to support this assertion. Furthermore, analysis of
the data also suggests that diversi￿cation acts as a substitute for ￿nancial development in
countries with poorly established economies. In these economies, increased diversi￿cation
lowers terms of trade volatility and continues to do so until the economy reaches critical level
of ￿nancial development. Thereafter, increased diversi￿cation may actually increase terms
of trade volatility. In the context of this paper, this critical level of ￿nancial development
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is reassuringly high; indeed it is a level of ￿nancial development signi￿cantly higher than
is averagely observed across all countries. Therefore, the results presented here suggest a
policy of increased diversi￿cation in primary commodity production will signi￿cantly reduce
terms of trade volatility in LDCs and may do so by acting as a substitute for ￿nancial de-
velopment as, almost by de￿nition, these economies will fall signi￿cantly below the ￿nancial
development threshhold.
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2.6 Appendix A: Commodities List
Wheat, rice, meat, dairy, ￿sh, barley, maize, vegetables (fresh), vegetables (prepared),
oranges, bananas, apples, grapes, ￿gs, fruit (preserved), sugar, co⁄ee, chocolate, tea, spices,
animal feed, beverages (non-alcoholic), beverages (alcoholic), tobacco, peanuts, soya, cotton
seeds, sun￿ ower seeds, sesame seeds, rape seed, copra, linseed, caster oil seeds, rubber,
wood, silk, cotton, jute, ￿ ax, true hemp, sisal, wool, guano, natural sodium nitrates, natural
phosphates, potassium salts, stone, sulphur, clays, common salt, slag, iron ores, uraninite,
copper ores, nickel ores, aluminium ores, lead ores, zinc ores, tin ores, manganese ores,
coal, natural gas, animal oils, soya oils, cotton oil, peanut oil, sun￿ ower oil, linseed oil,
coconut oil, caster oil, olive oil, palm oils, ￿xed vegetable oil, essential oils, nitrogen fertilizer,
phosphate fertilizer, pos fertilizer, silk yarn, wool yarn, cotton yarn, quicklime, pearls, iron
and steel, copper, nickel, lead, zinc, tin, silver and platinum, uranium, aluminium, gold skins,
diamonds, petroleum oils, live animals.
NB. Where extremely similar products were listed separately under WTA classi￿cation,
these products were aggregated. This does not represent a totally comprehensive list as
some subcategories within WTA database include ￿ not explicitly speci￿ed￿or residual terms.
When these terms were substantial, matches were attempted using various country guides.
If one was not found, this term was counted as a single commodity.
2.7 Tables
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Table 2.1: Dependent Variable: Terms of Trade Volatility, t=1987
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPC(s=0.05), t -1.322 -2.780￿￿
(0.898) (1.053)
NPC(s=0.025), t -1.419￿￿ -2.171￿￿￿
(0.609) (0.721)
NPC(s=0.01), t -1.175￿￿￿ -1.689￿￿￿
(0.340) (0.394)
P/Ex Ratio, t 76.38￿￿ 79.50￿￿￿ 71.13￿￿
(29.92) (29.49) (27.92)
Openness, t -60.26￿￿ -66.44￿￿ -65.47￿￿
(28.96) (28.64) (27.00)
GDP, t -1.012 -0.743 -0.928
(1.281) (1.232) (1.161)
Country Size 1.667 1.688 2.138￿
(1.340) (1.306) (1.233)
Water/Land -35.13 -39.72 -44.57
(31.73) (31.26) (29.55)
Elevation -1.935 -1.860 -1.822
(1.862) (1.817) (1.695)
Landlocked 1.932 3.310 3.032
(4.421) (4.278) (4.038)
Temp. Zone Land -2.112 1.193 0.985
(8.839) (8.839) (8.284)
Africa 5.555￿ 5.221 3.473
(3.222) (3.178) (3.035)
French Legal Origin 0.701 -0.524 -0.522
(3.374) (3.393) (3.165)
Catholics 0.0372 0.0504 0.0478
(0.0505) (0.0507) (0.0455)
Constant 21.07￿￿￿ 23.51￿￿￿ 25.86￿￿￿ 36.02 31.91 35.34
(2.708) (2.850) (2.690) (23.75) (22.75) (21.34)
Observations 98 98 98 81 81 81
R2 0.022 0.053 0.111 0.334 0.352 0.422
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.2: Dependent Variable: Terms of Trade Volatility, t=1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPC(s=0.05), t -1.312 -2.830￿￿￿
(0.953) (1.003)
NPC(s=0.025), t -1.493￿￿￿ -1.919￿￿￿
(0.554) (0.646)
NPC(s=0.01), t -1.198￿￿￿ -1.480￿￿￿
(0.317) (0.383)
P/Ex Ratio, t 78.89￿￿￿ 64.30￿￿ 63.34￿￿
(24.82) (24.99) (23.99)
Openness, t -53.96￿￿ -48.26￿￿ -54.23￿￿
(23.55) (23.39) (22.55)
GDP, t -0.226 -0.540 -0.618
(1.243) (1.263) (1.198)
Country Size 1.299 1.538 1.785
(1.262) (1.278) (1.218)
Water/Land -30.30 -30.10 -38.44
(30.69) (30.52) (29.26)
Elevation -1.217 -1.050 -1.203
(1.701) (1.681) (1.619)
Landlocked 4.769 2.182 1.559
(4.125) (4.282) (4.097)
Temp. Zone Land -3.710 -3.729 -1.575
(7.339) (7.290) (7.082)
Africa 5.238￿ 5.266￿ 4.184
(3.067) (3.049) (2.917)
French Legal Origin 2.562 0.870 0.405
(3.185) (3.283) (3.144)
Catholics 0.00759 0.0291 0.0464
(0.0465) (0.0488) (0.0471)
Constant 20.87￿￿￿ 24.07￿￿￿ 25.94￿￿￿ 15.70 22.33 26.05
(2.726) (2.719) (2.526) (23.23) (23.67) (22.63)
Observations 98 98 98 83 83 83
R2 0.019 0.070 0.129 0.361 0.368 0.414
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.3: Dependent Variable: Terms of Trade Volatility, t=1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPC(s=0.05), t 0.0347 -2.698￿￿
(0.933) (1.073)
NPC(s=0.025), t -0.861 -1.795￿￿￿
(0.569) (0.621)
NPC(s=0.01), t -1.027￿￿￿ -1.260￿￿￿
(0.351) (0.404)
P/Ex Ratio, t 61.16￿￿￿ 53.74￿￿￿ 49.15￿￿￿
(17.49) (17.12) (17.07)
Openness, t -33.18￿￿ -30.68￿￿ -29.99￿￿
(13.61) (13.35) (13.22)
GDP, t 0.0286 0.356 0.513
(1.361) (1.302) (1.278)
Country Size 1.165 1.090 0.951
(1.296) (1.252) (1.222)
Water/Land -42.60 -38.19 -35.18
(31.44) (31.06) (30.85)
Elevation -1.799 -1.564 -1.246
(1.737) (1.689) (1.659)
Landlocked 5.294 5.981 4.530
(4.335) (4.253) (4.263)
Temp. Zone Land -6.396 -4.595 -2.173
(7.546) (7.528) (7.622)
Africa 5.639￿ 5.410￿ 5.112
(3.209) (3.164) (3.137)
French Legal Origin 2.336 2.819 1.811
(3.323) (3.267) (3.264)
Catholics 0.0127 0.0320 0.0375
(0.0465) (0.0478) (0.0476)
Constant 17.24￿￿￿ 20.82￿￿￿ 24.25￿￿￿ 13.75 6.134 4.962
(2.573) (2.638) (2.669) (25.22) (23.88) (23.53)
Observations 98 98 98 83 83 83
R2 0.000 0.023 0.082 0.334 0.351 0.362
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.4: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPC(s=0.05), t 0.254 -2.060￿￿
(0.841) (1.006)
NPC(s=0.025), t -0.662 -1.270￿￿
(0.508) (0.570)
NPC(s=0.01), t -0.909￿￿￿ -0.989￿￿
(0.323) (0.376)
P/Ex Ratio, t 52.65￿￿￿ 48.52￿￿￿ 45.85￿￿￿
(11.38) (11.21) (11.14)
Openness, t -24.53￿￿ -22.58￿￿ -23.85￿￿
(9.495) (9.223) (9.159)
GDP, t 0.571 0.910 0.910
(1.209) (1.140) (1.116)
Country Size 0.358 0.382 0.316
(1.129) (1.119) (1.087)
Water/Land -11.77 -12.17 -19.43
(29.56) (29.40) (29.05)
Elevation -1.851 -2.076 -1.665
(1.589) (1.592) (1.555)
Landlocked 8.781￿￿ 8.351￿￿ 7.080￿
(3.942) (3.920) (3.908)
Temp. Zone Land -6.809 -5.562 -3.394
(6.987) (7.017) (7.070)
Africa 5.244￿ 5.605￿ 5.538￿
(2.939) (2.934) (2.893)
French Legal Origin 2.428 2.589 2.163
(3.157) (3.109) (3.086)
Catholics 0.0156 0.0299 0.0330
(0.0450) (0.0472) (0.0454)
Constant 16.78￿￿￿ 20.04￿￿￿ 23.49￿￿￿ 7.863 0.696 2.065
(2.435) (2.387) (2.490) (22.72) (21.06) (20.69)
Observations 99 99 99 85 85 85
R2 0.001 0.017 0.075 0.422 0.428 0.442
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.6: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=1987
(1) (2)
Norm Herf 27.28￿￿￿ 34.26￿￿￿
(4.219) (6.909)


























Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.7: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=1990
(1) (2)
Norm Herf 30.50￿￿￿ 39.50￿￿￿
(4.016) (6.649)


























Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.8: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=1995
(1) (2)
Norm Herf 31.20￿￿￿ 28.75￿￿￿
(4.642) (6.816)


























Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.9: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=2000
(1) (2)
Norm Herf 27.77￿￿￿ 25.84￿￿￿
(4.039) (6.369)


























Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.10: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=1987
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPC(s=0.01), t -0.723 -1.991￿￿
(0.655) (0.915)
FDNPC1, t -0.0274￿￿ -0.0110
(0.0118) (0.0184)
NPC(s=0.025), t -0.156 -2.993￿
(1.124) (1.764)
FDNPC2, t -0.0461￿ 0.00645
(0.0236) (0.0397)
Fin Dev, t -0.0259 -0.0645
(0.131) (0.148)
P/Ex Ratio, t 129.9￿￿￿ 137.4￿￿￿
(42.74) (46.48)
Openness, t -76.82￿ -74.12￿
(39.57) (42.98)
















Constant 34.69￿￿￿ 29.38￿￿￿ -2.375 -3.211
(4.577) (4.777) (18.48) (19.48)
Observations 83 83 78 78
R2 0.143 0.063 0.431 0.353
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.11: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPC(s=0.01), t -0.857 -3.521￿￿￿
(0.664) (0.944)
FDNPC1, t -0.0156 0.0292
(0.0111) (0.0273)
NPC(s=0.025), t -1.098 -5.816￿￿￿
(1.166) (1.557)
FDNPC2, t -0.0225 0.0698￿
(0.0182) (0.0382)
Fin Dev, t -0.321 -0.449￿
(0.260) (0.231)
P/Ex Ratio, t 131.0￿￿ 123.2￿￿
(49.28) (50.42)
Openness, t -98.70￿ -75.94
(50.89) (51.49)
















Constant 34.24￿￿￿ 32.13￿￿￿ -2.319 -2.764
(4.802) (4.998) (20.34) (20.09)
Observations 73 73 67 67
R2 0.101 0.069 0.511 0.481
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.12: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=1995
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPC(s=0.01), t -0.378 -3.451￿￿￿
(0.698) (1.043)
FDNPC1, t -0.0126 0.0491￿
(0.00994) (0.0268)
NPC(s=0.025), t -0.355 -5.389￿￿￿
(1.087) (1.592)
FDNPC2, t -0.0203 0.0759￿
(0.0184) (0.0400)
Fin Dev, t -0.437￿ -0.365￿
(0.233) (0.194)
P/Ex Ratio, t 73.65 87.48￿
(44.91) (44.78)
Openness, t -45.34 -51.36
(40.15) (40.47)
















Constant 29.44￿￿￿ 27.77￿￿￿ 2.060 -1.635
(4.833) (4.504) (21.43) (20.65)
Observations 73 73 67 67
R2 0.051 0.034 0.388 0.393
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
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Table 2.13: Dependent Variable Terms: of Trade Volatility, t=2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPC(s=0.01), t -0.647 -3.270￿￿￿
(0.694) (0.891)
FDNPC1, t -0.00699 0.0343￿￿
(0.00845) (0.0160)
NPC(s=0.025), t -0.261 -4.009￿￿￿
(1.022) (1.332)
FDNPC2, t -0.0164 0.0479￿
(0.0166) (0.0275)
Fin Dev, t -0.312￿ -0.245￿
(0.156) (0.129)
P/Ex Ratio, t 89.77￿￿￿ 97.00￿￿￿
(26.26) (27.35)
Openness, t -36.10 -31.76
(23.29) (24.07)
















Constant 30.75￿￿￿ 27.62￿￿￿ 7.001 1.071
(4.772) (4.336) (18.68) (18.70)
Observations 74 74 68 68
R2 0.048 0.025 0.529 0.495
Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:1, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01




STICKS AND STONES: A THEORY OF POINT RESOURCES
AND APPROPRIATION
3.1 Introduction
This paper aims to contribute to the growing literature of theoretical models dealing
with ￿con￿ ict and appropriation￿ . Although the ￿rst general equilibrium model of this type
was presented in the overlooked work Haavelmo (1954), it is not until Hirshleifer (1988,1989)
that a concerted e⁄ort really came together in this ￿eld12. This paper extends the model
found in another important contribution, Grossman and Kim (1996), which was the ￿rst
paper to combine two important facets of general equilibrium con￿ ict models. Firstly, the
incorporation of private production shifted focus away from the models of an appropropri-
able, common pool resource, as described by Hirshleifer (1989) and Skaperdas (1992) among
others. Secondly, the distinction between predation and defense against predation that en-
ables a non-aggressive, yet not fully disarmed, equilibrium3. In this paper, a parameter
representing the pointiness of the resource endowment of each agent is included in the model
and of key interest is the e⁄ect that this parameter has on the conditions for non-aggressive
equilibrium. Further, the analysis of Grossman and Kim (1996) shows that a relatively rich
agent is always better o⁄ in equilibria with more secure claims to property yet if o⁄ensive
weapons are highly e⁄ective and appropriation is not overly destructive, then a relatively
poor agent could be better o⁄ in equilibria with less secure claims to property. Thus the
analysis of this paper also covers the e⁄ects of pointiness on the costs of appropriation and
on agents￿welfare, both individually and relatively.
The term pointiness, in this paper, will used to characterise two key aspects of the
resource endowment. One of the dimensions along which the pointiness of resources can be
classi￿ed is the geographical concentration of their means of production. The pointier a given
1See Gar￿nkel (1990), Grossman (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Esteban and Ray (1999), Wittman (2000),
and Mehlum et al. (2003) for other key contributions.
2See Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas (2006) for a detailed overview of the literature of con￿ ict economics.
3The distinction is ￿rst made by Skogh and Stuart (1982), but the possibility of a non-aggressive equi-
librium is not considered.
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resource, the more clustered its means of production. Thus, resources may be distinguished
by geographical grouping, point resources (such as oil wells or ore/mineral mines) that are
extracted from a geographically narrow base are distinct from di⁄use resources, which are
(more thinly) spread across a wider area, such as agricultural land or forests. The other
dimension of pointiness that this paper proposes is the mobility of resource. Resources that
are less cumbersome, easier to transport and generally more ￿ mobile￿are de￿ned as being
more pointy. These two aspects of the characteristic of pointiness are important in a model
of appropriation and defense. Similar resources may di⁄er in their means of production
and thus, their level of pointiness (alluvial diamonds in comparison to mined diamonds) or
di⁄ering resources may be produced in similar clusterings (alluvial diamonds in comparison
to plantation crops).
The overall consensus within the growth literature is that there exists a negative relation-
ship between development indicators and the pointiness of resources45. It has been widely
suggested that pointy resources can fuel inequality within societies as, being geographically
clustered, it is more probable that these resources are controlled by smaller groups, exclud-
ing others67. An extension of this argument is to propose that pointiness is likely to be at
important factor when agents are rent seeking. Auty (2001) argues that pointier resources,
having more geographically concentrated modes of production and thus revenues and rents,
may be more easily appropriable or promote certain groups or agent types. In particular, a
government having control over an exogenous form of revenue, in the form of point resources,
has much less need to extract revenues from the populace in the form of taxation state and
so has much less inclination to develop the institutions that are associated with developed
states, resulting in the state falling behind (see Ross (2001). In cases such as this, taxation
of non-resource sectors will be low, modes of accountability poor and with frequent violent
coups occuring (see Auty (1997), Woolcock et al. (2001), Isham et al. (2003), Murshed
(2004), Mavrotas et al. (2006)).
However, it should also be noted that there is strong evidence to suggest that the rela-
tionship between resources and con￿ ict intensity is not unambiguous; indeed that there may
exist a non-monotonic between the two. This implies that there are cases in which more
4Bulte et al (2005) investigates the links between welfare and resource pointiness and abundance.
5For a more extensive survey of the literature on the e⁄ects on natural resource abundence, see van der
Ploeg (2010).
6For further details of resource-based gangs, paramilitaries and warlords, see Reno (1998) and Le Billon
(2001).
7For more detailed work on point resources and inequality, see Ross (1999), Engerman and Sokolo⁄
(2000), Ross (2004b) and Isham et al. (2005).
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pointy resources may be less heavily contested, to the extent that no con￿ ict occurs at all, or
that the presence of pointy resources during intense con￿ ict can coordination a more rapidly
achieved peaceful outcome. Wick and Bulte (2006) uses a model with a standard contest
success function and interprets the decisiveness/e⁄ectiveness parameter as the pointiness
of the contestable resource. Analysis of the model shows that under certain conditions, a
comparison of agents￿behaviour either side of a given threshold indicates that increased
pointiness can imply a reduction in rent seeking e⁄ort. The model presented in this paper
describes a similar e⁄ect, that the in￿ uence of the pointiness of the resource on the level of
appropriative activity in non-monotonic, due to increased pointiness being at the same time
bene￿cial to the defender (as a pointier endowment is easier to defend) and the attacker (as
pointier resources are subject to lower levels of appropriative destruction). The overall e⁄ect
of increased pointiness on appropriative behaviour depends on which of these two e⁄ects
prevails.
The multiple e⁄ects of resources on con￿ ict intesity is consistent with the ￿ndings of Ross
(2004), which describes the observable e⁄ects of nine hypotheses concerning the in￿ uence of
natural resources on civil wars. The ￿ndings of the examination of thirteen case studies show
that each instance may be explained by one or a number of the hypothesised mechanisms,
which themselves may in￿ uence di⁄ering aspects of the con￿ ict; initiation, intensity and
duration8. Ross (2004) states that ￿resources do not necessarily make con￿icts longer or
more severe - at times they appeared to shorten con￿icts and promote cooperation among
opposing sides.￿Further, Bennet and Stam (1996) ￿nds that international con￿ icts have a
tendency to last longer when the sides have more equal resources. As weaker side gains
resources, the con￿ ict is lengthened but as the stronger side gains resources, the con￿ ict
will be shorted. Therefore, if the stronger agent engages in resource appropriation, con￿ ict
becomes more decisive and victory (or settlement) will be brought about more quickly. If
agents are more equal then con￿ ict will be lengthened, as the duration of the con￿ ict will
be determined by the net out￿ ow of resources from the weaker agent. In the later analysis
presented in this paper, the issues of appropriative behaviour, costs and welfare are addressed
in the context of hetergenously pointy resource endowments.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; section two sets out the model and
derives allocations to defense and appropriation, section three provides furher analysis in the
context of costs and welfare, section four provides case study evidence of the applicability of
8Fearon (2001) also ￿nds that the relationship between resources and civil wars is more complex than
previously thought, resource dependence is associated with the duration, but not incidence, of civil wars.
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the model and section ￿ve concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Set-up of the model
The following model is an extension of that presented in Grossman and Kim (1995)9. In
a one period model there exists two agents, each agent having an initial positive resource
endowment, ni where i = 1;2. Endowments are classi￿ed as non-overlapping claims to
property that is subject to appropriation by the other agent and can therefore be thought
of as private property10. The security of claims to private property, i.e. the strength of
property rights, is a represented by an endogenously determined variable. Each agent may
allocate proportions of the initial endowment to three rivalrous uses; defence, appropriation
and the production of a non-contestable consumption good. Sequentially, each agent ￿rst
chooses a level of initial endowment to commit to defending its own endowment against
appropriative actions of the other agent. In doing so, the agent also considers the value
of defensive forti￿cations as a deterrent to appropriation. Thus, agent i, where i = 1;2,
allocates an amount, hi, to defensive forti￿cations from its initial endowment, ni, subject
to constraint 0 ￿ hi ￿ ni. Once made, the defence allocation, hi, is irreveribly committed
by the agent for the entire duration of period, i.e. the defensive investment may not be
diverted into production or appropriation in the case of the other agent choosing not to
engage in appropriative behaviour. Next, the remainder of the endowment, ni ￿ hi, is
divided by the agent between productive and appropriative uses, where ki is the amount
allocated to productive capital and gi to appropriative capital (o⁄ensive weapons) subject
to ki ￿ 0, gi ￿ 0 and ki + gi = ni ￿ hi. The production process, which is assumed to be
independent for each agent, produces consumable goods that are themselves not subject to
appropriation by the other agent11. The production function of agent i is given by f (ki) =
￿ki, where ￿ is a positive productivity parameter. After the complete allocation of the
initial endowment and the production of consumable goods, the entire endowment of agent
i, regardless of allocation, can potentially be appropriated by the other agent. Thus, one
agent can capture another￿ s productive capital, defensive forti￿cations and o⁄ensive weapons
but not the output of consumable goods. The security of a given agent￿ s claim to their
9In aspects of the model not including the parameter ￿, analytical structure directly follows Grossman
and Kim (1995).
10It terms of the aims and direction of this paper it is perhaps easier to consider the initial endowment
as fungible capital.
11Both of these assumptions are made in order to simplify the model.
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endowment is demonstrated by the fraction of its own endowment that the agent is able to










In the above equations, xi measures the o⁄ensive strength of agent j in relation to the
defensive strength of agent i, ￿ is a positive parameter that indicates the e⁄ectiveness of
o⁄ensive weapons against defensive forti￿cations and ￿i is a measure of the pointiness of
the fungible capital of agent i. Further, if ￿i < ￿j then this implies that the endowment of
agent i is more di⁄use than the endowment of agent j. The parameter ￿ is considered as
continuous and ￿nite. From equation (4.6), it can be seen that pi is a decreasing function
of xi and 0 ￿ pi ￿ 1. Also, due to the possibility of asymetric pointiess of endowments
and the distinction between o⁄ensive weapons and defensive forti￿cations, the proportion of
endowment, pi, retained by agent i can be greater than, equal to, or less than the fraction of
endowment that agent j loses, 1￿pj. The relative e⁄ectiveness of o⁄ensive weapons, ￿, may
be a⁄ected either positively or negatively by technological innovations. The development
of cannon12 or the innovations in castle design by Master James of St. George13 provide
examples of each. It may also be seen that pi, brie￿ y abstracting from any indirect e⁄ects, is
an increasing function of ￿i. This follows as the more pointy an endowment, the easier it is for
an agent to defend and the security of the agent￿ s claim to property is stronger. For example,
a mine shaft (pointy) will be easier to defend that a forest (more di⁄use) or alternatively,
valuable minerals (pointy) will be easier to protect from appropriation than timber (more
di⁄use). In other general equilibrium models where con￿ ict occurs over a common pool
resource, a Contest Success Function (CSF) is speci￿ed to determine the extent of victory14.
Here the CSF for agent j is simply given by 1 ￿ pi.
This model allows for a destructiveness in appropriation, so that in appropriation the
aggressor gains less than the defender loses. Speci￿cally, agent i loses the fraction of its
endowment, 1 ￿ pi, yet agent j gains only the fraction (1 ￿
￿
￿i)(1 ￿ pi) of the endowment
12By the 15th Century, the development of cannon had revolutionised European siege warfare throughout
Europe. Previously, thick castle walls were used to deter would-be aggressors but were now rendered obsolete
by heavy cannon ￿re. Further, see Chartrand, R (2005)
13Master James of St. George was a stonemason, engineer and architect responsible for designing many
of the Edwardian castles in North Wales, including Conwy, Harlech and Caernarfon. Further, see Taylor,
A.J. (1950)
14For an overview of contest success functions, see Skaperdas (1996).
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of agent i. The parameter ￿ measures the destructiveness of predation15, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. For
example, endowment seized through appropriation is subject to destruction due to con￿ ict,
deterioration during shipment or a predator￿ s gain needs to be processed to be usable. How-
ever, the destructive nature of appropriation is somewhat negated by the pointiness of the
contested resource, ￿i. The pointier the endowment, the less is the net destruction due to
appropriation. It is easier transport or process, but harder to denigrate, diamonds than tim-
ber for instance. It is assumed that the pointiness of any given endowment is larger than the
rate of destruction associated with appropriation, ￿ > ￿. Thus, the focus of this paper is on
the collection of commodities/endowments that are su¢ ciently pointy such that the net rate
of gain by the appropriating agent is positive i.e. 1 ￿
￿
￿ > 0. It must be noted however that
this model does predict that there is a range of endowment pointiness, for all ￿ such that
1 ￿
￿
￿ < 0, for which the other agent will choose not to engage in appropriative behaviour.
This behaviour is induced by the fact that the endowment is so di⁄use that the appropriating
agent is unable to appropriate/gather/process the endowment without incurring costs that
would ultimately prove to be prohibitively high.
The net result of the allocative activities of both agents is that agent i has a ￿nal non-
negative endowment wealth, mi, where
mi = pini + (1 ￿
￿
￿j
)(1 ￿ pj)nj (3.2)
The objective of each agent is to maximize the sum of its production of consumable
goods and its net endowment wealth, denoted by vi, where
vi = ￿ki + mi (3.3)
The fundamental trade-o⁄ an agent faces is that devoting a higher amount of its initial
endowment to appropriation, rather than to the production of non-contestable consumable
goods, decreases that agent￿ s output, ￿ki, but increases the agent￿ s ￿nal wealth, mi.
3.2.2 Resource Allocation: O⁄ensive Weapons
In order to analyse the allocation of the initial endowment, the model is solved backwards
by ￿rst considering the choice, between productive capital and o⁄ensive weapons, made by
the agent in the second-stage. At this stage, agent i takes the defensive allocations made
by both agents, hi and hj, as given and chooses allocations to productive capital, ki; and
15Note the simplifying assumption that the same parameters, ￿, ￿, and ￿, apply to both agents.
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to o⁄ensive weapons, gi, such that the agent maximises the net sum of its ￿nal assets, vi,
subject to the constraints ki ￿ 0, gi ￿ 0, and ki + gi = ni ￿ hi. The constraint ki ￿ 0 is
assumed not to be binding, i.e. that agent i would not want to allocate a negative amount
to productive capital (ki < 0) or, equally, to allocate more its initial endowment towards
appropriation (gi < ni). Thus, it follows that the marginal cost of o⁄ensive weapons is given
by ￿, the constant marginal product of capital in the production sector. Equations (4.6),










nj ￿ ￿ = 0; gi > 0 (3.4)









nj ￿ ￿ ￿ 0; gi = 0 (3.5)
The above conditions state that if agent i chooses a positive allocation of resources
to appropriative activities, then this allocation is such that the marginal cost of o⁄ensive
weapons equals the marginal bene￿t (the increased amount of the endowment of agent j
that agent i obtains). Alternatively, if agent i chooses not to allocate any resources to
appropriative activities, then at the point gi = 0, the marginal cost of o⁄ensive weapons
equals or exceeds the marginal bene￿t. By deriving dpj=dgi from equation (4.6), we see that









for 0 < hj < h￿
j













In equation (4.2), h￿
j is the minimum necessary allocation to defensive forti￿cations by
agent j that will deter agent i from allocating any resources to appropriation. Speci￿cally,
if hj < h￿
j, then equation (3.4) applies; whereas if hj ￿ h￿
j, then equation (3.5) applies. Fur-
thermore, h￿
j depends positively with the initial endowment of agent j and the e⁄ectiveness
of o⁄ensive weapons against defensive forti￿cations and depends negatively on the marginal
productivity of capital and the destructiveness of appropriation. The e⁄ect of the level of
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pointiness of the endowment of agent j on the minimum necessary defensive allocation for
deterrance is less clear. There is a negative e⁄ect as the pointier the resource endowment
of agent j, then the easier it is for agent j to defend his endowment and the lower the level
of resources needed to achieve the same level of security. This is apparent from equation
(4.6). Conversely, there is a positive e⁄ect insofar as the destruction to the gain from ap-
propriation by agent i is lower given a pointier resource, which is demonstrated by equation
(4.7). The gain from appropriation is now higher for agent i, who will now be willingly to
commit more resources to appropriative activities. In order nullify this reallocation, agent
j must present a larger deterent in order to disincentivise appropriative activities by agent
i and hence, the minimum necessary defensive allocation for deterrance must be higher.
The parameters of the model determine which of these two e⁄ects dominate. Speci￿cally if
￿j > 2￿, then the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates, a marginal increase in pointiness aids the defender
(through easier defence) more than the aggressor and the derivative, dh￿
j=d￿j, is negative.
Equally, if ￿j < 2￿, then the second e⁄ect dominates, a marginal increase in pointiness aids
the aggressor (through increased gains) more than the defender and the derivative, dh￿
j=d￿j,
is positive. The closer the value of endowment pointiness is to the critical value, 2￿, the
higher the allocation to defensive forti￿cations necessary to ensure non-aggression from agent
i. Furthermore, it can be seen that for any ￿j < ￿, then the defender would wish to invest
a negative amount in defensive forti￿cations16. The endowment of this agent is so di⁄use
that the other agent would have no interest in engaging in appropriative behaviour. This
clari￿es the statement above, that there exists a range of very di⁄use resources, outside of
the general workings of this model, for which the optimal behaviour of the other agent would
be non-aggression.
3.2.3 Resource Allocation: Defensive Forti￿cations
Next, the ￿rst-stage choice of defensive forti￿cations is considered. At this stage, the
allocation to defensive fortications, hi, by agent i is take as given by agent j, who chooses
defensive forti￿cations, hj, to maximize the sum of ￿nal assets, vj. When choosing the
allocation to defensive forti￿cations, agent j takes into account how this choice a⁄ects the
allocation to o⁄ensive weapons, gi, by agent i. Given the schedule for the allocation to
o⁄ensive weapons by agent i set out in equation (4.11), equation (4.8) implies that, in the
limit as hj ! 0, dvj=dhj becomes in￿nite and so the constraint hj ￿ 0 can be taken as
not binding. Further, it is assumed that the constraints hj ￿ nj and kj ￿ 0 will not be
16Note the assumption in the previous subsection, ￿i;j > ￿
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binding17. As in Grossman and Kim (1996), the existence a non-aggressive equilibrium, and
the conditions necessary to ensure that equilibrium, are of particular interest. In order for
agent i to make no allocation to o⁄ensive weapons, the parameters of the model must be
such that agent j chooses an allocation to defensive forti￿cations equal to the threshold level,
h￿
j. Furthermore, with agent i making no allocation to o⁄ensive weapons, the security of
property claims of agent j are completely secure, pj = 1. As such equation (4.8) implies
that the sum of the ￿nal assets of agent j, vj, is a decreasing linear function of that agent￿ s
allocation to defensive structures, hj. Then, from equation (4.8) it can be seen that vj has











)nj ￿ ￿ = 0; with 0 < hj < h
￿
j (3.8)












)nj ￿ ￿ > 0; with hj = h
￿
j (3.9)
The above equations demonstrate that if agent j chooses a defensive allocation less than
the threshold, then this allocation is such that the marginal bene￿t and cost of defensive
forti￿cations are equal, where the marginal bene￿t of defensive allocation includes both a
direct e⁄ect of the allocation on the security of claims and an indirect e⁄ect of the same
relationship, via the deterent e⁄ect of the defensive allocation on the o⁄ensive allocation of
agent i. Alternatively, if agent j chooses a defensive allocation less than the threshold, the
marginal bene￿t of defence exceeds the marginal cost. Substituting for dpj=dhj, dpj=dgi and








for 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿2
j
for 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿2
j
(3.10)
The above speci￿cation describes the equilibrium allocation to defensive forti￿cations
by agent j. Equation (4.1) demonstrates that the level of defensive forti￿cations depends
negatively on the production parameter and on the e⁄ectiveness of o⁄ensive weapons and
positively on the level of appropriation destruction and size of the endowment of defending
agent, nj. The relationship between the level of defensive forti￿cations and the pointiness
of the endowment of the defender is dependent on a threshold level of pointiness, 2￿. For
any ￿j < 2￿, then exists a positive correlation betwen the two, whilst the opposite is true
17This implies that the marginal cost of defensive forti￿cations is also ￿.
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for any ￿j > 2￿.
The threshold that determines the nature of the equilibrium strategy of the agent,
whether it is characterised by appropriation or non-aggression, is given by the relationship
between 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ and ￿2
j. The more e⁄ective that are o⁄ensive weapons and the less
destructive that is appropriation, then the more likely that the equilibrium strategy will be
characterised by agent j engaging in appropriation. As the inequality is quadratic in ￿j,
a marginal increase in the level of pointiness makes a non-aggressive strategy more likely
only on the condition that ￿ < ￿j. For cases in which o⁄ensive weapons are more e⁄ective,
relative to the pointiness of the endowment, the same marginal increase moves the models
towards, or reinforces, an appropriative strategy. It is important to note that the threshold in
the model need not be unique. As stated previously, for any value of endowment pointiness
less than the value of the appropriative destruction parameter, i.e. ￿j < ￿, the potential
appropriator cannot realise a positive gain, due to net destruction, and non-aggression is
enforced. If appropriative destruction is high and o⁄ensive weapons are not very e⁄ective18,
then a non-aggression strategy by the potential appropriator may continue to be optimal for
a range of di⁄use endowments, ^ ￿j￿[￿;￿￿], subject to 2(^ ￿j ￿ ￿)￿ = ^ ￿
2
j. The possible spectra
of optimal strategies, for di⁄ering levels of pointiness, arising in the model are discussed in
the following subsection.
3.2.4 Security of Claims to Property













for 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿2
j
for 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿2
j
(3.11)
In the above speci￿cation, it can be seen that if agent j attains the minimum necessary
defensive allocation for deterrance, h￿
j, which occurs when 2(￿j￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿2
j, then agent i does
not commit any resources to o⁄ensive weapons, gi = 0. However, if 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿2
j, then
agent j will make an allocation to defensive forti￿cations, such that hj < h￿
j, and agent i will
appropriate. Thus, gi will be positive and proportionate to the size of the endowment being
appropriated, nj
19. Furthermore, if gi > 0, the second term in the square bracket in equation
18Further, ￿ must be high and ￿ must be low relative to each other.
19See Appendix A for the necessary conditions so for that for both agents, and for all variations of
pointiness as described in section three, h + g ￿ n
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(3.11) is proportional to the defensive allocation of agent j and so for ￿j < 2￿, a marginal
increase in pointiness of the endowment will lead to an increase the appropriative allocation of
agent j. Simple algebra shows that the proportional increase in the appropriative allocation
by agent i is greater than the proportional decrease of the defensive allocation of agent i. If
a region exists such that
q
2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿j > ￿, the more e⁄ective are o⁄ensive weapons
and the more di⁄use the contested endowment then the more likely that agent i increases
appropriative allocation in response to a marginal increase in the pointiness of the contested
endowment.
By combining equations (4.1), (3.11) and (4.6), the equilibrium value of the security of









In the above equation, if 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿2
j, then the defensive allocation of agent j
is su¢ cient to act as an e⁄ective deterent, agent i choose not allocate any endowment to
appropriation and the claims to property of agent j are fully secure, with pj = 1. Otherwise,
the endowment of agent i is too di⁄use, o⁄ensive weapons too e⁄ective or appropriation not
destructive enough for agent j to be able to deter appropriative activity by agent i. As
appropriation is not e⁄ectively detered, claims to property are less than fully secure. Again,
recognise that the security of claims to property with appropriation is proportional to the
defensive allocation of agent j and so for ￿j < 2￿, there is a negative correlation between
the pointiness of the endowment and the security of claims to property of agent j. Also,
note the equilibrium value of the security of claims is independent of the size of endowments,
which follows as both hj and gi are both portionate to the size of the endowment. As the
parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿ are assumed to be identical for both agents, this implies that agents
have identical security of claims to property if and only if both agents are endowed with
equally di⁄use resources.
Depending on the values of the parameters for appropriative destruction and e⁄ectiveness
of o⁄ensive weapons, the space ￿ < ￿j ￿ ￿max may be characterised by one, two or three
distinct regions of optimal strategy. The quadratic nature of the threshold condition rules
out the sequence of regions, for increasing values of pointiness, of appropriation - non-
aggression - appropriation, otherwise the sequence of optimal strategy is fully determined
by the two parameters (￿ and ￿). Indeed, for very low values of appropriative destruction
and/or very e⁄ective o⁄ensive weapons the entire strategy space, ￿ < ￿j ￿ ￿max, may
be characterised by appropriation. The opposite also holds true. Further, as the strategy
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space may consist of three regions, non-aggressive regions for relatively di⁄use or pointy
endowments and an appropriative region for averagely pointy/di⁄use endowments, it can
be seen that the same, non-appropriative behaviour may be induced in each agent for very
di⁄erent endowment types. Agents need not hold homogenous resource endowments in order
for a non-appropriative equilibrium to be sustained. This is a unique ￿nding in the sense that
the strategy space is not completely characterised by non-aggresion. For this organisation of
the optimal strategy space, the non-aggressive equilibrium may not be stable if the agents,
in a theoretical sense, were to move towards homogeneity at an average ￿ pointiness￿of their
endowments.
Thus, this model shows that the relationship between con￿ ict and pointiness of resources
may take on many forms, forms are (mostly) determined by other parameters speci￿ed within
the model. Whereas Wick and Bulte (2006) theorises a non-monotonic relationship where,
given certain conditions increased pointiness may lead to a reduction in rent seeking, this ￿nd-
ing shows that the relationship may more more complex than. Furthermore, this complexity
would seem to be constistent with the ￿ndings of Ross (2004) and may help to explain the
existence multiple outcomes observed from situations of resource abundance.
3.3 Further Analysis
In the following analysis, and given that the other parameters of the model (￿, ￿ and ￿)
are identical for both agents, three types of equilibrium are possible.
Firstly, an appropriative equilibrium occurs when the resource endowments of the agents
are such that 2(￿i ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿2
i and 2(￿j ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿2
j, so neither agent ￿nds it optimal to
invest in defensive fortications to the extent of completely detering the other agent from
engaging in appropriative activity. Both agents allocate a positive level of endowment to
o⁄ensive weapons, so gi;gj > 0, and claims to property will be less than fully secure, with
pi;pj < 1. The levels of endowment pointiness which sustain this equilibrium are denoted
￿i;A and ￿j;A
20.
Secondly, a non-aggressive equilibrium in which the resource endowments of the agents
are such that 2(￿i￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿2
i and 2(￿j￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿2
j, so both agents ￿nd it optimal to invest the
minimum necessary allocation to defensive forti￿cations to completely deter appropriative
activity by the other agent. Both agents make no allocation to o⁄ensive weapons, gi;gj = 0
and claims to property will be fully secure, pi;pj = 1. The levels of endowment pointiness
20Thus, agent j with endowment characterised by ￿j;A, induces hj < h￿
j, gi > 0 and pj < 1.
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which sustain this equilibrium are denoted ￿i;N and ￿j;N
21
Lastly, a mixed equilibrium in which the endowment of one agent is characterised by
￿A and the other has an endowment characterised by ￿N . Thus, the latter engages in
appropriative behaviour whilst the former does not and the latter has completely secure
claims to property whilst the former does not. The following section discuss these scenarios
in the context of the total costs of appropriation and agent welfare.
3.3.1 The Cost of Appropriative Activities
The total cost of appropriation22 is given by




(1 ￿ pj)nj (3.13)
Firstly, agents su⁄er an opportunity cost of appropriation and defense as a result of di-
verting proportions of their endowments towards defensive structures and o⁄ensive weapons
and away from productive capital. This cost is equivalent to ￿(hj + gj + hi + gi). Secondly,
there is a cost associated with the destructiveness of appropriation, endowment that is com-




(1 ￿ pj)nj. Equations
(4.1), (3.11) and (3.12) can be used to show that total costs depend on the parameters ￿, ￿, ￿
and the endowments of the agents. In a non-aggression equilibrium, agents do not incur any
costs related to appropriative destruction and so total costs depend only on the opportunity












where cN;N speci￿es the strategies of each agent (non-aggression, non-aggression). In
this case, equation (3.14) demonstrates that the cost for each agent is directly proportional
to their allocation to defensive forti￿cations, such that cz = ￿h￿
z as above. Therefore,
the correlations between agents￿costs and the parameters of the model follow the same
relationships as under the derivation of the minimum necessary allocation to defensive for
deterence, h￿
j.
Under an appropriative equilibrium, agents incur both an opportunity cost and a cost
related to appropriative destruction. Equation (3.15) indicates that the total cost, cA;A,
is no longer monotonically related to the e⁄ectiveness of o⁄ensive weapons, ￿, or to the
21Thus, agent j with endowment characterised by ￿j;N, induces hj = h￿
j, gi = 0 and pj = 1.
22NB Total cost refers to the society as a whole.
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destructiveness of appropriation, ￿. However, as noted by Grossman and Kim (1996), for
equilibria with relatively high security of claims to property, i.e. as p ! 1, a monotonic
and negative relationship emerges between p and c. Accordingly, in the model presented
here, changes in ￿, ￿ or ￿ that increase p reduce the cost associated with appropriation and
dominate any o⁄setting e⁄ect created by foregoing the production of consumables. Therefore,




















Further analysis of equations (3.14), (3.15) shows that costs in a non-aggressive equilib-
rium are not unconditionally lower than costs in an appropriative equilibrium, i.e.there are
pairings of parameters for which cN;N ￿ cA;A. However, this is only true for appropriative
costs functions derived from parameterisations of the model that result in ￿ appropropiation￿
being the optimal strategy for entire space, ￿ < ￿j ￿ ￿max. This follows intuitively as the
entire strategy space is only characterised by appropriation when appropriative destrustion
is very low and/or o⁄ensive weapons are very e⁄ective, i.e. when net appropriate costs are
very low.
Total costs for a mixed equilibrium, in which agent i has a endowment with pointiness

























Agent j invests in a su¢ cient defensive forti￿cation so that agent i chooses not to ap-
propriate. However, agent i cannot optimally do the same, given a resource endowment
charactised by pointiness ￿i;A. Therefore, the size of the endowment of agent i in￿ uences
the opportunity cost of defence for agent i, the opportunity cost of o⁄ence agent j and the
loss to appropriative destruction whereas the size of the endowment of agent j in￿ uences the
opportunity cost of defence for agent j. It should be noted that although higher costs may
be attributed to the appropriating agent, the transfer of wealth from the defender to the
aggressor is not included in total ￿ social￿cost but will obviously a⁄ect the ￿nal net assets of
each agent. Welfare is discussed in the following subsection.
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3.3.2 The Welfare E⁄ects of Appropriation
The welfare of each agent is measured by the sum of production of consumables and net
endowment ￿ ows, vi and vj, as given by equation (4.8) Of particular interest the relationships
between welfare and the parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿ and the conditions under which the welfare
of an agent is higher in any non-aggressive equilibrium than in any equilibrium characterised
by claims to property that are not fully secure. By combining equations (4.8), (4.1), (3.11)23,
(4.7) and (3.12)24, the welfare of each agent may be derived.
For non-aggressive equilibria, when the endowments are characterised by ￿i;N and ￿j;N,
the welfare of agent i is given by









Equation (3.17) demonstrates the negative correlation between welfare and the opportu-
nity cost of defensive provision, as outlined in equation (3.14). Therefore, in an equilibrium
characterised by non-appropriation, the relationship between the parameters of the model
and the welfare of agent i is the inverse of the relationship between these parameters and the
total costs borne by agent i, as outlined above. Further, unless the endowments of the agents
are identical, in terms of pointiness and size25, then the welfare of the two agents will di⁄er,
vi 6= vj. It may be the case that the agent that begins the period as the richer agent bears,
relatively or absolutely, the higher costs (as the endowment is larger to defend or level of
pointiness of the endowment that implies a higher deterrence requirement). Therefore, the
possibly exists of the initially richer agent becoming the poorest by the end of the period,
i.e. if ni > nj but vi < vj. Thus, a non-aggressive equilibrium may not necessarily preserved
the ￿ social ordering￿ , despite an absence of appropriative activity.
For appropriative equilibria, when the endowments are characterised by ￿i = ￿i;A and


























In appropriation characterised equilibria, vi, like the total cost function c, is not neces-
sarily monotonically related to ￿, ￿ or ￿. Further, the welfare of agent i depends not only
on the initial endowment of agent i but also on the initial endowment of agent j, so the
23Equations (4.1) and (3.11) are used to give the equilibrium value of ki.
24Equations (4.7) and (3.12) are used to give the equilibrium value of the net ￿nal endowment wealth,
mi.
25The analysis abstracts from the case in which ￿i;N 6= ￿i;N but h￿
i = h￿
j.
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relationships between vi and ￿, ￿ and ￿ depend on the relative size of the initial endowment
of agent i relative to that of agent j. As with the cost function, it is not always the case
that agents are always better o⁄ in a non-aggressive equilibrium that in an appropriative
equilibrium.
In mixed equilibria, if it is assumed that agents have endowments characterised by ￿i =









whereas the welfare of agent j (the appropriating agent) is given by


































Due to the plethora of equilibria possible, it is di¢ cult to make generalisations regarding
relative welfare of the agents. Grossman and Kim (1996) conclude, more generally, that if
agent i is relatively rich, then the economic welfare of agent i is higher the more secure are
claims to property i.e. that the richer agent prefers less e⁄ective o⁄ensive weapons and higher
appropriative destruction. However, the richer agent in this model may favour lower values of
appropriative destruction and more e⁄ective o⁄ensive weapons if the result of the change in
parameters is a gain in appropriable endowment that outweighs any increase costs of defence
(which is possible due to varying levels of endowment pointiness between agents). Likewise,
less secure claims to property do not necessarily serve to increase the welfare of a relatively
poor agent. The rich will only favour conditions that encourage universally secure claims to
property if there are no ￿ easy pickings￿to be had and the poor only favour weaker claims to
property if it does not make themrelatively easy prey. Thus, the ambiguous, non-monotonic
e⁄ects of endowment pointiness in this model may contradict the more straight-forward
results presented in Grossman and Kim (1996).
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3.4 Case Studies
The mechanisms outlined in this model are clearly apparent in two contemporary cases,
outlined more extensively in Ross (2004), of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra
Leone.
3.4.1 Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) experienced
a steady change to small-scale, alluvial mining from large-scale, deep shaft mining. In terms
of the model presented in this paper, this shift equates to a reduction in the pointiness of
the endowment, ￿. In the case of the former, small teams of unskilled workers can extract
diamonds from the accessible, softer soils of the upper layers of an (expansive) alluvial
plains. The latter, however, requires the use of heavy, technical equipment within a more
con￿ned geographical areas in order to reach diamonds that may be several hundreds metres
underground, encased within other rocks or minerals. Indeed, the fact that diamonds are
encased in this way and would, therefore, need to be carefully processed in order to maximise
payo⁄, serves to increase the destructiveness of appropriation parameter, ￿.
According to MacGa⁄ey (1991), this structural change helped to create small military
units, which were independent from the central government, which ￿ ourished in this industry,
forming rackets and selling protection to the small-scale miners. It was also common for
miners to form collectives in order to ensure their own self-defense units. Furthermore,
DRC military units became involved in the trade in primary resources and arms, in order to
become self-￿nancing. Reno (1998) notes of cases in which military generals sold protection to
alluvial miners and of generals using military units to transport primary commodities, often
internationally. It is very likely that these activities, weakening of government military forces
and privateer protection of miners and mining facilities/areas, contributed to a considerably
weaker overall defence of the natural resources of the DRC. In terms of the model, this
equates to a decrease in the level of defensive forti￿cations, h.
The model presented in this paper would suggest that this combination of changes in key
variables would lead to a higher incentive for any outside agent to engage in appropriative
behaviour against the DRC. Indeed, there is strong evidence to support the theory that
these were the fundamental factors that encouraged rebel groups, led by the Rwandan and
Ugandan armies, to initiate the war in 1996. The UN Panel of Experts (2001) reports that
agents within both Rwanda and Uganda were keen to pro￿t from the appropriation of the
natural resources of the DRC, in part as a means to o⁄set the cost of the attack.
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3.4.2 Sierra Leone, 1991
The case of Sierra Leone very much mirrors that of DRC, outlined above. The alluvial
diamond ￿elds were controlled by fragmented groups of privateer gangs and rogue military
groups that organised protection for the agents within the small-scale industry26. As such,
the government￿ s military forces and it￿ s in￿ uence within the region became weakened. Reno
(1998) documents an attempt by the government, in 1991, to re-assert authority over the
region that led to the displacement of thousands who subsequently joined rebel groups, in
particular the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In this case, government forces had been
steadily weakened resulting in lower defense capabilities, h, and rebel groups had become
better armed in quality and quantity (increasing ￿ and g) due to the recruitment of displaced
paramilitaries and privateers. As stated above, alluvial diamonds can be considered a less
pointy resource than mined diamonds, which may be considered as an incentive for an
appropriative agent. It is these factors, and the abrupt changes in many of these factors,
that the presented model argues contribute to the initiation of con￿ ict. These factors may
have been fundamental in the decision of Liberia￿ s Charles Taylor to become involved in the
civil war. In addition, the proximatey of the alluvial ￿elds to the Liberia-Sierra Leone border
and the di¢ culty of tracing the source of con￿ ict diamonds27 serves to reduce the parameter
￿ in the presented model, further incentivising appropriative actions.
As an aside, the anaylsis of Ross (2004) rules out the hypothesis of the Collier-Hoe› er
￿looting￿mechanism as being an underlying cause of any the thirteen con￿ icts under dis-
cussion, including the two above. However, analysis of these two cases in the context of the
model presented in this paper would appear to give weight to the looting mechanism argu-
ment. In particular, lower pointiness of resource endowments lead to a rise (or strengthening)
of organized predation, a willingness to take advantage of more easily available rents.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper has extended the general equilibrium model of appropriation and production
as presented in Grossman and Kim (1996). The model presented here includes a parameter
to represent the pointiness of the contended resource endowment, where the pointiness of a
resource is de￿ned along the dimensions of the geographical concentration of its means of
production and its mobility. A higher level of endowment pointiness has two functions in the
26For further details, see Hirsch (2001) and Richards (1996).
27For more on the issue of tracing con￿ ict diamonds and the Kimberley Process, see Olsson (2007).
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model, which oppose each other in terms of determining equilibrium outcome. Firstly, point
resources are easier to defend than di⁄use resources, thus aiding the defender. However,
point resources are also subject to lower (net) levels of apppropriative destruction, thus in-
centivising the appropriating agent. It is these opposing e⁄ects that create the non-linearities
that are key to the results presented here.
The ￿ndings presented here demonstrate that the relationship between resource pointi-
ness and con￿ ict may take on many forms. Depending on the parameterisation of the model,
the agents￿strategy space ￿ < ￿j ￿ ￿max may be characterised by one, two or three distinct
regions of optimal strategy, of which only one strategy schedule along this space is ruled
out. It is also shown that agents need not hold homogenously pointy resource endowments
in order for non-aggressive or appropriative equilibrium to be sustained, grreatly varying
resource endowments may induce the same type of behaviour in both agents. Whereas Wick
and Bulte (2006) theorises on the existence of a non-monotonic relationship where, given
certain conditions, increased pointiness may lead to a reduction in rent seeking the model
presented here suggests that this is only one of a number of possible relationships. Further-
more, this complexity would seem to be constistent with the ￿ndings of Ross (2004) and
may help to explain the existence multiple outcomes observed from situations of resource
abundance.
This paper has also demonstrated that costs in an non-aggressive equilibrium may not
always be lower than in any appropriative equilibrium, in contrast to the results of Gross-
man and Kim (1996). If appropriative destruction is very low and o⁄ensive weapons are
very e⁄ective then the costs of appropriation are very low and the whole strategy space is
characterised by appropriate behaviour. It is only in these circumstances that an appropria-
tive equilibrium mayhave lower total costs than a non-aggressive equilibrium. In terms of
welfare, it was demonstrated that a non-aggressive equilibrium may not necessarily preserved
the ￿ social ordering￿ , despite an absence of appropriative activity. Further, the rich will only
favour conditions that encourage universally secure claims to property if there would be no
relatively ￿ cheap￿targets created as a result of weaker security of claims. Likewise, the poor
may not automatically favour weaker claims to property.
There are a number of potentially interesting extensions to this paper, both theorectical
and empirical.
Firstly, the development of a dynamic model in which the end of period, net assets of the
agent (v) would serve as the initial resource endowment of the next period. Of particular in-
terest would be cases in which pointiness of agents￿endowments di⁄ered, potentially causing
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agents to switch from non-aggressive agents to appropriators (and potentially back again)
as resources ebb and ￿ ow between agents. If analysis of wealth and wealth distribution is
analysed, questions regarding the incentivising of peace be addressed. Under what conditions
can peace be brokered rather than continuous, appropriative destruction ending in Easter
Island style collapse? Further, the model (dynamically or statically) many be enriched by
the inclusion of a greater number of agents or endowments consisting of a greater number of
resources than there are agents.
In terms of empirical extensions, an application to speci￿c case studies would provide
validation of the model. Given adequate sources of data, a full calibration of the model may
be possible in order to test the results presented here.
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3.6 Appendix A
Following Grossman and Kim (1996), from (4.1) and (3.11) the necessary conditions for
h+g ￿ n for any given agent may bed derived. In the case of an appropriative equilibrium,
agents have endowments characterised by levels of pointiness ￿i = ￿iA and ￿j = ￿jA, the

















As agents￿endowments are not necessarily homogenous, this imples a corresponding
necessary condition for agent j. Thus, both necessary conditions must be ful￿lled in order for
the equilibrium to exist. In the case of a non-aggressive equilibrium, agents have endowments
characterised by levels of pointiness ￿i = ￿iN and ￿j = ￿jN, the necessary condition for agent
i is given by:







Again, there is a corresponding necessary condition for agent j and both necessary
conditions must be ful￿lled in order for the equilibrium to exist. In the third case, of a
mixed equilibrium, if it is assumed that agents have endowments characterised by ￿i = ￿iN
and ￿j = ￿jA, then the necessary condition for agent i is given by


















Agent j will not engage in appropriative behaviour and the corresponding necessary






Again, both necessary conditions must be ful￿lled in order for the equilibrium to exist.




THE KIDS AREN￿ T ALRIGHT: CHILD MORTALITY AND
THE PERSISTENCE OF CHILD LABOUR
4.1 Introduction
A large proportion of the previous literature on the subject of child labour, and indeed
the literature concerning intergenerational transmission of inequality and its persistence as
a whole1, have identi￿ed failures in capital markets as a key factor in the persistence of
intergenerational child labour within poorer households2. Some works, such as Baland and
Robinson (2000), have, however, demonstrated that child labour may persist in poorer house-
holds if the returns education are low, even with perfect credit markets whilst others discuss
the role played by human capital externalities3. Chakraborty and Das (2005) abstacts from
capital markets and identi￿es a distinct mechanism which, operating through endogenous
adult mortality risk, reduces the e⁄ective return to children￿ s education for poorer house-
holds, thereby contributing to the persistence of child labour. There is no altruistic link
between successive generations. Children are treated solely as a source of current and future
income by young parents. During childhood, o⁄spring contribute to their parent￿ s income by
working (when not being educated) and as adults, they provide pension-like support to old-
aged parents through transfers dictated by cultural norms. The key demographic variables of
fertility, health investment and education are all decided by parents4. Endogenous mortality
is captured by specifying a positive relationship between the probability with which a parent
survives into old age and health investment. Essentially, this implies a positive relationship
between income level and the rate of time preference. Lawrence (1991) and Samwick (1998)
provide strong empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Thus, endogenous mortal-
ity may play a fundamental role in changing the incentives of relatively poor parents and
creating child labour traps.
1See for example Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997),
Ghatak and Jiang (2002), Mookherjee and Ray (2002, 2003)
2See Basu (1999) and Ranjan (2001),
3See Galor and Tsiddon (1997).
4Duraisamy (2002) shows that parental preferences play an important role in decisions regarding children,
such as education.
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This paper presents a discrete time, overlapping generations model that extends Chakraborty
and Das (2005) by including a child survival function. Therefore, the model allows for the
possibility of the child dying between childhood and adulthood or more speci￿cally, that a
child may die before attaining any of the bene￿ts of the educational investment that the child
has received. Previous works have addressed the issue of child mortality and parent choice.
Cigno (1998) and Blackburn and Cipriani (1998) endogenise child survival probability by
making child mortality subject to parental decision and these papers, along with Olsen and
Wolpin (1983), suggest that at low levels of development, parents optimally choose high
levels of child mortality. More recently, Doepke (2005) quantitatively addresses the issue of
child labour in a Barro-Becker framework with exogenous child mortality.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; section two sets out the model and
derives solutions, section three provides analysis in the context of policy and section four
concludes5.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Outline and Survival Functions
This paper is an extension of the model of Chakrborty and Das (2005)6. In the discrete-
time, overlapping-generations model presented here, individuals can potentially live for three
periods; "childhood", "adulthood" and "old-age". The individual survives, with certainty,
for the entire ￿rst period of life whereas survival into adulthood and then further into old-age
is uncertain and depends upon the level of health investment, ht, made by the young parent.
Young parents have children at the beginning of the period as well as making all household
decisions at this time.
The parameter ￿t describes the probability of the young parent surviving into old-age







where 0 < ￿ < 1. Thus, the survival function of the young parent is a twice di⁄erentiable,
concave function and if a young parent chooses not to invest anything in healthcare, then
5I thank Agnese Leonello for her patient assistance with some of the computational aspects of this paper.
6In aspects of the model not including the parameter ￿t, analytical structure directly follows Chakrborty
and Das (2005).
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they die before old age with certainty7. The probablity of a child￿ s survival into adulthood
is denoted as ￿t and is also dependent on the health investment taken by the parent of the
child, ht. Health investment by the young parent, ht, is not just a personal investment but







where 0 <   < ￿. The child￿ s survival function, like that of the young adult, is twice
di⁄erentiable and concave with respect to health investment. It is assumed that health
investment is more e⁄ective, in terms of survival, for children than adults as children are
more frequently and to a larger degree more susceptable to disease and illness. Further,
children do not have the built-up immunity to many diseases and illnesses that may been
acquired by adults. Thus, it is considered that health investment is fundmentally more
important to a child￿ s survival probability.
4.2.2 Work and Education
In each period, individuals are endowed with a single unit of time. Children divide their
time between work and school, whilst young parents divide their time between raising chil-
dren and work. The old-age individuals only consume a proportion of wealth, ￿, transfered
to them from the gross income of any surviving children. For each child that a young parent
chooses to raise, a ￿ cost￿is incurred as the parent is required to devote a proportion of time,
￿, to childcare. Thus, for given number of o⁄spring the parent chooses to issue, nt, there
remains a total time available to the young parent for work of 1 ￿ ￿nt. Work consists of the
production of a perishable consumption good using labour supplied by those in adulthood
(young parents) and, possibly, their children. Output per e¢ ciency unit of labour, or the
wage, is given by !.
The initial young generation are born at t = 0 with a given distribution of human capital
fe0
ig. A young parent decides on the health invest of the family, the number of o⁄spring,
whether or not to send their children to work and how much to educate them. Young parents
are only di⁄erentiable from each other by their levels of educational capital, et
t￿1. As well as
the allocation of their own time, young parents decide the allocation their children￿ s time.
Children may either be sent to work, in order to increase the income of the household during
that period, or to school, in order to receive an education and increase their future labour
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productivity. Child are sent to school for a fraction of their time endowment, et 2 [0;1],
whilst all the time not spent in school is spent working, such that lt = 1 ￿ et. Therefore,
labour productivity of a young parent is given by 1 + et￿1 but education is not assumed to
increase the productivity of the child. Further, it is assume that children are less productive
than an uneducated adult8, such that the output of a working child is (1 ￿ et)￿ where ￿ is
productivity parameter associated with children, such that ￿ < 1. As the child￿ s education
decision by the young parent is akin to the education decision, as child may only work or go to
school, parents face a trade o⁄ between current and future consumption. Increased current
consumption is a result of increased child labour participation, lower school participation
and so implies lower future consumption, as young adults who have received less educated
have lower productive capabilities and provide lower transfer payments.
4.2.3 Utility
At date t, a representative young parent maximizes their expected lifetime utility over
















where ￿ represents the subjective discount rate, where ￿ 2 [0;1]. It is assumed that
utility derived from death is zero and no bequests exist between parent and child. Utility is
a twice di⁄erentiable, concave function rate within this model. In e⁄ect ￿￿t represents an
endogenously determined discount rate. Further, note that there is no altruistic mechanism
linking successive generations of the household. Children are regarded as a source of current
and future consumption by self-interested parents and transfers to the older generation are
assumed to be governed by social convention.
In total a young parent makes three choices (health investment, fertility and children￿ s
education investment) and in doing so faces the following budget constraints:
c
t
t = ￿! (1 ￿ et)nt + (1 ￿ ￿)! (1 + et￿1)(1 ￿ ￿nt) ￿ ht (4.4)
c
t
t+1 = ￿￿(ht)! (1 + et)nt (4.5)
8Children in preindustrial Europe gradually drifted into work from around the age of seven or eight.
Much of their labor was casual and undemanding, for they were not strong enough to take on most of the
tasks required on a farm or in a workshop. Heywood (2004)
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where nt represents the fertility choice of the young parent, with nt ￿ 1.
The budget constraint for the young parent is written under the assumption that the
grandparent is alive in period t and that child mortality rates are taken into account directly.
We focus on this case with loss of generality. The Kuhn￿ Tucker necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst-
















































From equation (4.7), it can be seen that, at an interior optimum, the marginal rate of










(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + et￿1)￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ et)
￿ R
n
The numerator signi￿es the expected incxrease in old-age consumption as a result of an
additional child; a product of the contribution rate ￿, the child￿ s future education-augmented
productivity (1 + et) and the child￿ s survival probabilty ￿t: The denominator represents the
associated cost of that child; foregone adulthood earnings net of the child￿ s labour income.
Also, from equation (4.8), it can be seen that young parents will educate their children
as long as the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is at least as large as the return











In the above inequality, the return to education is given by the ratio between the marginal
contribution of a child￿ s education to old age income and the productivity of child labour.
Note tht both of the inequalities presented above are dependent on the child survival function
but not on the survival function of the young adult. Naturally, a quantity/quality trade-o⁄
occurs, the result of which depends on the relationship between the two returns. If the
return to education dominates, such that Re > Rn, then a young parent will act to maximise
the quality of o⁄spring over and above the quantity of o⁄spring. Thus, the young parent
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minimises the number of o⁄spring, so nt = 1, and the child receives a strictly positive level of
education, et > 0. Conversely, if the return to the quantity of children dominates, Rn > Re,
the young parent has numerous children (nt > 1) but does not invest in their education
(et = 0) and therefore children are required to work for the entirety of their available time
(lt = 1)9. It can be seen from the two returns that young parents will prioritise quantity of
o⁄spring over quality of o⁄spring when:




If the education capital of the young parent is below a given threshold, ￿ e, this implies
quantity investment in children will take place10. Child labour productivity (￿) and the
proportion of labour income transfered from young adults to old parents (￿) are both pos-
itively correlated with the threshold as increases in either of these parameters increase the
opportunity cost of educating children, requiring young parents who are relatively ￿ better
o⁄￿before education can begin. Raising the cost of each children (￿) naturally lowers the
demand for children. Note that this threshold is independent of the child survival function
and so does not di⁄er in any from the corresponding threshold of Chakrborty and Das (2005).
As education is linked to productive e¢ ciency for young parents, it is when young parents
are relatively poor that they will decide to have a greater number of children rather than
fewer, but better educated, children.
4.2.4 Solving the Model
In order to investigate the intergenerational dynamics of the model, preferences are
speci￿ed as a CES utility function:
u(c) = c
1￿￿; ￿ 2 [0;1]
When returns to education dominate, Re > Rn, the young parent minimises the number
of children. Thus, substituting nt = 1 into equation (4.6) and (4.8) and combining under
the given CES preferences yields:
9My father has been dead about a year; my mother is living and has ten children, ￿ve lads and ￿ve
lasses.....three lasses go to mill; all the lads are colliers.....I never went to day-school; I go to Sunday-school,
but I cannot read or write - Patience Kershaw, aged 17.
Testimony from British Parliamentary Papers (1842)
10Assuming 2￿ > (1 ￿ ￿)￿ > ￿
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["￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)"￿](1 + et) (4.11)
where "￿ ￿ h￿
0=￿ is the elasticity of the young adult survival function and "￿ ￿ h￿
0=￿
is the elasticity of the child survival function. Using the survival functions from equations








The positive relationship between children￿ s education and health investment is, in
Chakrabortya and Das (2005), the driver of the prevalence and persistence of child labour.
Children potentially provide an income for the young parents, in both the adulthood and
old-age of those parents. Parents who do not invest in health, thereby decreasing their
probability of survival, expect to die earlier and are, therefore, less willing to substitute
contemporaneous income and consumption for old-age income and consumption. This is
demonstrated by the decrease in the e⁄ective discount rate, ￿￿(ht). Young parents ￿ front-
load￿consumption by sending their children to work rather than to school. It is, therefore,
a prerogative of relatively rich parents to invest signi￿cantly in health to improve longevity
and send their children to be educated.
The mechanism introduced in this paper reinforces this e⁄ect. From equations (4.11)
and (4.2), it can be seen that there is a positive e⁄ective between health investment and
child survival, so young parents who are unable to invest in health can expect fewer of their
children to survive into adulthood and again, are disincentivised from substituting income
and consumption towards old-age. Equations (4.3) and (4.5) may be re-arranged to show that
introduction of child mortality e⁄ectively reduces the endogenous discount rate, such that
it is given by ￿￿(ht)[￿(ht)]
1
￿. Thus, the introduction of a child survival function e⁄ectively
lowers the discount rate further than in the model of Chakrabortya and Das (2005).
In the ￿rst instance, young parents have disincentives to invest in children of quality
if they cannot adequately guarantee their own survival to take advantage of the delayed
bene￿ts of the child￿ s education. In the second instance, young parents have disincentives to
invest in children of quality if they cannot adequately guarantee their children￿ s survival. As
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a result, the relatively worse o⁄ young parents prefer to send their children out to work.






[￿ (1 ￿ et) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + et￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ h(et)] = ￿(1 + et)￿t (4.13)
where ht ￿ ￿ !h(et). This expression describes the intergenerational evolution of educa-
tion (and thus also the intergenerational evolution of child labour) for families where parental
education exceeds the threshold ￿ e, as outlined in equation (4.9). This may be re-arranged
such that




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
"








The above equation shows that the addition of child mortality will drive down the level of
education a young parent allocates to their child. As the term in child survival is positive
and greater than unity, the young parent requires a higher level of education in order to
achieve any given positive level of child education, et.
Whereas the su¢ cient condition in Chakrabortya and Das (2005) for F (et) to be in-
creasing and concave is given as "￿ < ￿, the corresponding su¢ cient condition in this paper
is given as a weighed sum of the two survival elasticities, "￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)"￿ < ￿13. From equa-
tion (4.10), it can be seen that the weighed derivative terms must be equal to the weighted

















11Disregarding the child survival function, Chakrabortya and Das (2005) erroneously omit the subjective
discount rate, ￿, from the following function.
12Disregarding the child survival function, Chakrabortya and Das (2005) erroneously omit the subjective
discount rate, ￿, and the term ￿ (1 ￿ et) from this function.
13In calculating the su¢ cient condition, this paper, as in Chakrabortya and Das (2005), abstracts from the
secondary e⁄ects of child￿ s eduction on the elasticities of survival as they have been shown to have neglible
in￿ uence.
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Given the conditions that ￿ 2 [0;1], 0 < ￿ <   < 1 and that the parameter ￿ is identical
to both models, the only way in which equation (4.16) holds (and thus by extension equation
(4.10)) is that for a given level of children￿ s education the presence of a child mortality risk
induces the young parent to make a higher investment into health than under conditions
where child survival is certain. Further, from this ￿nding, it can be shown that the ￿rst
derivative of equation (4.15) is more positive and the second derivative is more negative
with the inclusion of child survival than under the conditions of Chakrabortya and Das
(2005).
If the su¢ cient condition is achieved, the function Q is a monotonically increasing trans-
formation such that
et = F
￿1(et￿1) ￿ Q(et￿1) (4.17)
and so equation (4.14) may be transformed to
lt ￿ q(lt￿1) (4.18)
for lt￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ e and q(l) ￿ 1 ￿ Q(1 ￿ l), where q is an increasing concave function.
Suppose, instead of the scenario outlined above, that returns to quantity of children
outweigh the returns to quality, Rn > Re, which implies that young parents have relatively
low levels of education, et￿1 < ￿ e. These parents have numerous children, nt > 1, choose not
to educate them, et = 0, and so these children work full-time, lt = 1. Combining equation
(4.6) and equation (4.7) yields:
ht =
[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + et￿1)￿ ￿ ￿]
(1 ￿ ￿)
["￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)"￿]!nt ￿ h(et￿1;nt) (4.19)
In this scenario, there is a positive relationship between human capital investment
and the number of o⁄spring14. Healthier individuals have a higher likelihood of surviving
in old-age and so are more willing to invest in children, by producing more of them, and
foregoing present consumption in the form of payment of care costs in order to receive higher
contribution from their children during old-age. Combining the above equation with equation
14Assuming, as previously, that the marginal cost of raising a child is greater than the immediate return,
that is ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) > ￿.
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vt￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + et￿1)￿ ￿ ￿
Equation (4.20) de￿nes the deterministic relationship between the optimal number of
children and the educational capital of the parent, et￿1. Taking families in which parents
choose not to educate their children, i.e. where parents possess et￿1 < ￿ e16, it is obvious that
the grandchidren of those parents will also remain uneducated, plus the great-grandchildren
and so forth, for all future generations eminating from those parents. In these families, the
time invariant, optimal fertility rate for any period t ￿ 1 can be devised from this relationship


















As can be seen from equation (4.19), health investment will achieve a steady state under
these conditions. Further, this implies that both child and adult survival rates will be time
invariant rates. Equation (4.21) demonstrates the negative relationship between the optimal
number of children, n￿, and the child survival function, ￿. When the uneducated young
parent is particularly poor, health investment is very low and children are less likely to
survive. In order to try and achieve a certain level of old age income, the young parent
will produce a greater number of children in the knowledge that fewer will survive into
adulthood and the greater numbers of children that will be engaged in full-time work17.
Young, uneducated parents who face a higher child survival rates optimally choose to have
fewer children, aware that more of them will survive to transfer income in the future. Thus,
the addition to the model of the child survival function will exacerbate the child labour
problem in terms of absolute numbers. Parents who expect a high proportion of their children
to die before adulthood have a greater number of them in order ful￿l a need for an expected
15Disregarding the child survival function and thus setting "￿ = 0, Chakrabortya and Das (2005) carry
through previous errors, erroneously omit the subjective discount rate (￿) and, on the right hand side, give
the incorrect sign to the indice of ￿t￿1 from this function.
16As set out in equation (4.9).
17When women have children thick (fast) they are compelled to take them down early. I have been married
19 years and have had 10 bairns; seven are in life - Isabel Wilson, 38 years old, coal putter
Testimony from British Parliamentary Papers, (1842)
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income in later life.
4.2.5 Dynamics of the Model
In discussing the dynamics of child labour, the fundamental aspect of the model is the
relation of the initial distribution of education, fei
0g, to the threshold given by ￿ e. For ei
0
> ￿ e, the dynamics of the model are de￿ned by equation (4.18), conditions under which
it is possible to achieve multiple steady-states. Both ￿gures presented below exhibit two
curves (for di⁄ering parameterisations); one given by lM
t that represents the equation (4.18)
presented in this paper and the other, given by lCD
t , as reference of the same schedule as
given by Chakrabortya and Das (2005).
l
45









In Figure 1, the phase map is given by lM
t for lt￿[0;1 ￿ ￿ e) and by lt = 1 otherwise. Two
stable steady states occur, at l￿
1 and 1, and it can be noted that the stable steady state at full
child labour is common to both models, as it occurs after the threshold. Any families with
initial education capital less than the threshold, ei
0 < ￿ e , are drawn to this steady state. The
second steady state occurs at l￿
1 and as l￿
1 > 0, child labour cannot be ￿ phased￿ out￿under
these conditions. As with the entire phase map before the threshold, lM
t > lCD
t for a given
level of parental labour participation, and so it follows that the steady state that occurs
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along lM
t is such that l￿
1 > ^ l. This steady-state l￿ can be seen to occur at a higher level of
both adult and child labour participation, and so at lower levels of educational participation,
than the corresponding steady state, ^ l, of Chakrabortya and Das (2005). Further, it may be
such that l￿
1 > 1 ￿ ￿ e > ^ l and in this case the e⁄ect of including child mortality have been to
reduce the model from having two stable steady states (one of which exhibits positive levels
of education) to a model of a unique, steady state where labour participation is complete.
Therefore, the inclusion of child labour makes it much more probable that a household faces
an absolute child labour trap, where regardless of initial education endowment, families will
converge to a situation where children are fully employed and never educated.








In Figure 2, the phase map is given by lM
t > 0 for lt￿ < 1 ￿ ￿ e and by the shaded
horizontal lines otherwise. The steady states that occur at 0 and 1 are stable, l￿
1 is not. If
the initial educational distribution of the family, ei
0, is below the threshold ￿ e, then families
converge to the stable steady state of full labour participation and this is the same under
both models, as above. However, in order to for a family to converge to the full education
steady state, the initial education distribution must be very high, such that ￿ e < 1￿l￿
1 < ei
0.
For any initial distribution that does not ful￿l this condition, the family will converge to the
full labour participation steady state. Thus it may be the case that even if a young parent
initially chooses quality over quantity, the poorer households with educational capital below
1 ￿ l￿
1, are unable to overcome their initial disadvantage, cannot sustain the education of
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their children over successive generations and continue to rely on fully realised child labour
participation in the long run.
Further, note that the initial education distribution in the presented model must be
higher than in the model presented by Chakrabortya and Das (2005) in order to prevent the
family from converging to a full labour participation steady state, i.e. 1 ￿ ^ l1 < 1 ￿ l￿
1 < ei
0.
Thus, the situation again presents itself that in a model with child mortality the educational
capital of the young parent must be higher than in a model without child morality in order
to achieve the stable steady state that is characterised by a positve level of child￿ s education.
It may also be that l￿
2 > 1 ￿ ￿ e > ^ l2 and, as above, an additional stable steady would exist
in a model without child mortality. However, under this parameterisation an absolute child
labour trap cannot occur.
These results demonstrate that the inclusion of a child survival function in the model
presented in Chakrabortya and Das (2005) can result in the reinforcement of the parental
discounting e⁄ect and further encourages the persistence of child labor and under-investment
in education in poorer families.
4.3 Policy implications
The ￿ndings of this paper demonstrate the importance of setting a range of intercon-
nected objectives in order to tackle the single issue of child labour. High levels of educational
spending or trying to enforce primary eduction will have little e⁄ect for situations in which
health care provision is low and mortality rates are high.
The UN Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) do not mention child labour but directly
address the issues that the presented model proposes are fundamental in the decision making
process of the young parent. Namely, the MDGs address primary education (Goal 2), child
mortality rates (Goal 4), maternal health (Goal 5) and the prevalence of preventable disease
(Goal 6). Advances in these particular ￿elds will have a dramatic indirect e⁄ect on the levels
of child labour and, the model predicts, lower the fertility rate.
Furthermore, it is important that any kind of policy intervention is targetted to ensure
resources are being used e¢ ciently. Often, the poorer sections of the population tend to su⁄er
from treatable infections or diseases but public money is often spent on relatively expensive
treatments that disproportionately bene￿t the wealthy. Government health spending towards
the rich in the form of cheap healthcare or insurance subsidies. For example, World Bank
(1993) notes that the Indonesia Government gave healthcare subsidies to the richest ten
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percent of the population that were nearly three times higher than the subsidies given to
the poorest ten percent. Of particular concern should be the targetting of children health.
In the analysis above, there exists a coupling of the survival functions due the fact that the
two functions are dependent on the same type of spending, household health investment. In
reality, these functions may be decoupled as certain types of spending may pertain to one
group rather than the other. For example, vaccinations programs are likely to be far more
e⁄ective at reducing child mortality relative to adult mortality. The opposite is likely true
of lung disease treatments or cancer. Both adult mortality and child mortality need to be
addressed, as in the MDGs, if child labour is to be greatly reduced.
It is not just the decision variables of the parent that may be targetted in order to re-
duce child labour. Nardinelli (1990) highlights the fact that, during the 1840s and 1850s, the
British silk industry employed a falling proportion of children in its workforce, even though
children were not covered by factory legislation during this period. New technologies resulted
in the disappearance of factory roles ful￿lled by children, which would correspond to a signif-
icant decrease in the child￿ s relative productivity parameter, ￿. Equation (4.9) demonstrates
that a decrease in children￿ s productivity reduces the parent educational threshold required
for quality over quantity. Landes (1972) supports this ascertion, that work in more tech-
nologically advanced factories ￿required and eventually created a new breed of worker,￿a
new breed that frequently did not include children. Nardinelli (1990) further suggests rising
wages may have enabled working-class parents to keep their children in school for longer,
being less relient on any income from child labour. It is interesting to note that in the model
presented here, wages (!) only directly a⁄ect health investment levels, as seen in equations
(4.11) and (4.19), and it is through health investment that wages indirectly a⁄ect educa-
tion/labour levels and optimal fertility levels, see equations (4.15) and (4.21). Thus, this
paper would suggest that rising wages do not reduce child labour by enabling to forego child
income but by reducing mortality rates of both parents and children, thus increasing the
value of education.
4.4 Conclusions
This paper has extended the discrete time, overlapping generations model of Chakraborty
and Das (2005). The model presented here includes a child survival function, where the rate
of survival of a child is dependent on the healthcare expenditure of the young parent. The
inclusion of this function reinforces the mechanism described in Chakraborty and Das (2005),
as child mortality induces an even higher rate of time preference in the young parent. As
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the child may die before the young parent realises the bene￿t of any educational investment,
so education becomes relatively more expensive and the young parent prefers contemporary
income from the child rather than an transfer in old age. As has been demonstrated above,
any non-binary steady state is associated with higher levels of child labour for the model
presented here, erlative to that of Chakraborty and Das (2005), and the introduction of a
child survival function may rule out steady states, which are characterised by positive levels
of education, that may otherwise exist. Thus, the inclusion of a child survival function into
the model serves to reinforce the prevalence and persistence of child labour.
Furthermore, it has been shown that these reinforcements may not just be small or subtle.
Given certain parameterisations of the model, the inclusion of child mortality may reduction
the number of stable steady states in the model. This may result in the ￿ destruction￿of
a steady state characterised by ￿ intermediate￿levels of education so that only the initially
￿ well-endowed￿can achieve the high level of stable education. Worse still, the destruction
of the only steady state characterised by positive education will result in an absolute child
labour trap whereby even families that are initially well educated will converge to a state of
absolute child labour.
It has also been shown that under conditions where young parents choose ￿ quantity￿over
￿ quality￿in their fertility decisions, then the inclusion of child mortality increases the number
of children a young parent decides to produce. As more children die before adulthood and
thus cannot make transfers to their old age parents, young parents choose to have more
children in order to ensure similar old age incomes.
This paper has also described the importance of wide ranging but targetted policy aims
in order to address the roots of child labour persistence and prevalence. The Millenium
Development Goals provide a particularly useful framework.
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